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•JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction by virtue of transfer and assignment from the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) and § 78-2-2(4) (2000).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly granted Appellees' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Appellants' claim for lost sign revenue.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly denied Appellants' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment as to whether Appellees breached the applicable standard of care as a
matter of law.
In considering an appeal from a trial court's decision of a summary judgment
motion, the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party
below. The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which
are reviewed for correctness. (Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-637
(Utah, 1989)).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum 1. They are:
UtahR. Civ. P. 41(a)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-136.4, 136.5, 136.6, 136.7 and 136.9
Ut. Admin. Code R. 933-2, et seq.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
Appellants Lynn D. Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen ("Kitchens")1 own property

adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 2700 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah ("Kitchen
Property"). In 1973 the Kitchens entered into a lease with Reagan Outdoor Advertising
("Reagan") which lease granted Reagan the right to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on
the Kitchen Property ("Reagan Lease"). The original term of the Reagan Lease was 20
years. (R. 835-837).
The original term of the Reagan Lease expired August 5, 1993. Thereafter,
Reagan maintained its sign on the Kitchen Property under a month-to-month tenancy. (R.
539, 563).

In approximately August, 1994 a dispute arose between the Kitchens and

Reagan as to whether or not Reagan had appropriately exercised its option to renew the
Reagan Lease for another 20 year term - - Reagan claiming it had, the Kitchens claiming
Reagan had not. (R. 456-462, 464-471, 473-483, 945-950). On September 13, 1994 the
Kitchens served Reagan with a Notice to Quit. The Notice to Quit informed Reagan that if
it failed to vacate the Kitchen Property by the end of September, 1994 Reagan would be
deemed in unlawful detainer. (R. 563).

'The Kitchens and appellants Edward Rogers, Terry Reid and Utah Outdoor
Advertising, d.b.a., Utah Sign, Inc. are at times referred to collectively as "Appellants."
-2-

In September, 1994 Reagan filed three complaints against the Kitchens and
Utah Outdoor Advertising aka Utah Sign, Inc. in Third District Court. The first Complaint,
CV 940905718, was assigned to Judge David S. Young. The second filed Complaint, CV
940905728, was assigned to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup. The third Complaint, CV 940905780,
was assigned to Judge Glen Iwasaki. (R. 443 and see Addenda 3,4 and 5 attached hereto).
At issue in the three complaints was whether Reagan had lawfully exercised its option to
renew the Reagan Lease for another 20 year term.
On October 8, 1994 Utah Sign removed Reagan's sign from the Kitchen
Property.

(R. 485).

On October 11, 1994 Reagan dismissed its complaint in CV

940905718. On October 14, 1994 Reagan dismissed its Complaint in CV 940905780. (R.
443). On November 9, 1994 Reagan filed an Amended Complaint in CV 940905728
alleging the specific facts of Utah Sign's illegal action in cutting down Reagan's sign. ("The
Underlying Action"). (R. 473-483).
After Utah Sign cut down Reagan's sign, the Kitchens and Appellants retained
appellee Steven B. Mitchell and his law firm, Burbidge & Mitchell ("Mitchell") to represent
them. After learning of the two previously filed and dismissed Complaints, Mitchell moved
to reinstate the previously dismissed Complaints and consolidate them with the first-filed
case. (R. 681 -683).
In December, 1995 Appellants terminated Mitchell's representation of them
and new counsel entered an appearance on Appellants' behalf. In January, 1997 the
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Underlying Action settled. (R. 14-15, 355). In September, 1997 The Kitchens and Edward
Rogers, Terry Reid and Utah Advertising, dba Utah Sign, Inc. ("Utah Sign") commenced
this action alleging Mitchell committed various acts of legal malpractice in his representation
of Appellants in the Underlying Action. Appellants' principal damage is for anticipated lost
revenue from an outdoor advertising sign they desired to erect on the Kitchen Property.
Appellants alleged Mitchell's legal malpractice caused the loss of this sign revenue.
Mitchell moved for partial summary judgment on Appellant's lost sign revenue
claim, arguing that neither the Kitchens nor Utah Sign could have lawfully maintained a sign
on the Kitchen Property notwithstanding any act or inaction by Mitchell. The trial court
granted Mitchell's partial summary judgment motion. (R. 1004-1007).
Kitchens and Utah Sign moved for partial summary judgment arguing that as
a matter of law Mitchell's conduct breached the standard of care. (R. 440-441). Mitchell
also moved for summary judgment on the standard of care issue, arguing that as a matter of
law Mitchell's conduct complied with the applicable standard of care. (R. 597-599). The
trial court denied Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment and Mitchell's motion
for summary judgment on the standard of care issue, concluding questions of fact existed
as to whether the standard of care was breached. (R. 1004-1007).
Subsequently, after Appellants amended their answers to interrogatories by
identifying their claimed damages as only lost anticipated revenue from the outdoor
advertising sign they desired to erect on the Kitchen Property, Mitchell moved for summary
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judgment. Mitchell argued that because the court previously granted summary judgment on
the lost sign revenue claim, Appellants suffered no damages regardless of whether the
standard of care was breached. (R. 1316-1335). Appellants did not oppose Mitchell's
motion (R. 1340-41) and it was granted by the trial court. (R. 1345-47).
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Facts Relating to Lost Sign Revenue Claim
In April, 1981 the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") granted

Reagan a permit to maintain an outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen Property. (R.320325).
On September 28,1994, UDOT granted Reagan's request to relocate its sign
approximately 166 feet south to property owned by Joe Doctorman & Son ("Doctorman
property"). As of September 28, 1994, Reagan held a UDOT permit to lawfully maintain
an outdoor Advertising sign on the Doctorman Property. Reagan completed the erection of
the sign on the Doctorman property in approximately December, 1994. (R. 320-325, 800,
897,906,910-911,913).
On October 10, 1994, after UDOT had issued Reagan the permit to relocate
its sign, Utah Sign applied for a UDOT permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the
Kitchen Property. UDOT denied Utah Sign's application for, among other reasons,
violation of a 500 foot spacing prohibition contained in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136, et seg. The 500 foot prohibition prohibits the erection of any
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outdoor advertising sign within 500 feet of an existing outdoor advertising sign. Reagan's
sign which UDOT had authorized Reagan to relocate from the Kitchen Property to the
Doctorman Property was the existing sign that precluded the erection of the sign sought in
Utah Sign's application for UDOT permit. (R. 320-327).
Arthur B. Coffin is the UDOT permits officer who granted Reagan's request
to relocate its sign. He also subsequently denied Utah Sign's request for a UDOT permit.
Mr. Coffin testified through affidavit that under the provisions of the Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act and UDOT rules adopted pursuant thereto, neither Utah Sign nor any other
entity could have lawfully erected a sign on the Kitchen Property without a UDOT permit.
Mr. Coffin testified that a sign could not be lawfully erected on the Kitchen Property as long
as an outdoor advertising sign was maintained on the Doctorman Property. (R. 320-323).
Mr. Coffin's testimony as to the various applications, and issuance of UDOT permits was
uncontroverted before the trial court.
B.

Incorrect Statements of Fact Made by Appellants Relating to Lost Sign
Revenue Claim
In paragraph 24 of their Statement of Facts, Appellants state that on September

2,1994, the date Utah Sign obtained a building permit from South Salt Lake City, "no other
signs nor permits to build other signs existed within 500 feet of the Kitchen Property

"

Contrary to Appellants' claim, Reagan's sign was on the Kitchen Property at that time. The
presence of Reagan's sign on the Kitchen Property at that time is not disputed by any fact
of record. Paragraph 24 does not create a factual dispute. The portion of the record cited
-6-

by Appellants to support the factual statement is simply a copy of the South Salt Lake City
building permit issued to Utah Sign.
In paragraph 26 of their Statement of Facts, Appellants claim Reagan
misrepresented to South Salt Lake City that its sign on the Kitchen Property would "come
down" to induce the city to issue Reagan a building permit to relocate its sign to the
Doctorman Property.2 However, it is undisputed the sign Reagan sought to relocate was
owned by Reagan. Accordingly, if Reagan represented to South Salt Lake City that the sign
would come down after the relocation, it was certainly an appropriate and reasonable
representation. On October 8, 1994, before Regan removed its sign, Utah Sign cut down
Reagan's sign and thereafter welded its sign on the remaining foundation. Utah Sign erected
this sign without the necessary UDOT permit. (R. 485, 540, 646-648, 1138-1139). These
facts are undisputed. The sign that remained on the Kitchen Property after Reagan obtained
the Smith Salt Lake City permit was, therefore, Utah Sign's sign, not Reagan's. These facts
are undisputed.
Finally, paragraph 22 of Appellants' statement of facts claims Reagan
remained in possession of the Kitchen Property and paid rent through August, 1994.
However, the undisputed fact is that Reagan maintained its sign on the Kitchen Property on
a month-to-month tenancy from August, 1993 to September 30,1994. On September 13,

2

UDOT regulations require that when a local authority requires a building permit
for an outdoor advertising sign, one must be obtained before UDOT will issue a permit
authorizing the erection of the sign. Ut. Admin. Rules R 933-2-4(15).
-7-

1994 the Kitchens served Reagan with a Notice to Quit. The Notice to Quit informed
Reagan that the month-to-month tenancy ended September 30,1994. (R.563). Appellants'
citation to the record to support the factual statements in paragraph 22 do not create a
question of fact. Appellants cite to a complaint filed in the Underlying Action. This is not
admissible evidence. Nevertheless, the complaint and its exhibits do not state that Reagan
remained in possession of the property through August, 1994 (R. 473-483).
C.

Facts Relating to Breach of Standard of Care
Utah Sign first consulted with Mitchell regarding their intention to cut down

the Reagan sign prior to doing so. Mitchell strongly advised Utah Sign, through former
plaintiff Terry Reid, that such action was probably a crime and would be a serious mistake.
(R. 616-617). Mitchell also informed the Utah Sign plaintiffs, again through Terry Reid,
that cutting down the sign would provide Reagan basis for claiming punitive damages in a
civil lawsuit and would taint the entire proceedings in that lawsuit. (R. 617).
Utah Sign admits that on October 8,1994 it removed the Reagan sign from the
Kitchen Property. It is important to note that the allegations in Reagan's three original
complaints were not based upon an actual forcible entry. Rather, the forcible entry claims
contained in those complaints were based upon Utah Sign's threats to forcibly enter the
Reagan property. Of particular significance is the representation contained in the complaints
wherein Reagan alleges "ROA is currently is [sic] peaceable possession of the leased

-8-

premises and continues to maintain its outdoor advertising sign on the site." (See e.g.
Addenda 3 and 5).
Reagan's Amended Complaint in the second-filed Complaint alleged a forcible
entry claim based on new facts: Utah Sign's illegal removal of Reagan's sign. (See Addenda
4). The court in the Underlying Action ruled against Utah Sign on the forcible entry issue.
The court's ruling in the Underlying Action on Reagan's claim of forcible entry highlights
the central weakness in Appellants' legal malpractice case -- Appellants largely brought
about their own downfall through the illegal act of cutting down Reagan's sign.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court appropriately granted Mitchell's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the lost sign revenue claim because, as a matter of law, Appellants could not
have lawfully maintained the sign from which they claimed to have lost revenue. Reagan
had the lawful right to maintain a sign within 500 feet of where Appellants' desired to locate
their sign. Because of the 500 foot prohibition contained in Utah's Outdoor Advertising
Act, Appellants were precluded from erecting and maintaining the sign.
The trial court correctly denied Utah Sign's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Expert testimony by attorney Gordon Roberts supports Mitchell's tactical
decisions in the Underlying Action. The trial court's subjective opinion about how it would
have ruled if presented with certain facts in the Underlying Action is irrelevant and
inadmissible.
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ARGUMENT
I.

MITCHELL DID NOT CAUSE APPELLANTS' LOST SIGN REVENUE
A.

Summary Judgment Standard
It is the plaintiffs' burden in a legal malpractice action to prove not only that

the attorney was negligent, but that the negligence proximately caused plaintiffs damages.
Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Ut. App. 1990).
A finding of such damages could not be properly based on
speculation or conjecture. They can be awarded only if there is
a basis in evidence upon which reasonable minds acting fairly
thereon could believe with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury and damage and also that it wras proximately
caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Dunn v. McKay. Burton. McMurray & Thurman. 584 P.2d 394, 896 (Utah 1998).
This court has held that a plaintiff must establish that but for the attorneys
negligence, plaintiffs' loss would not have occurred. Kilpatrick v. Wiley Rein & Fielding.
P.C.. 909 P.2d 1283,1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Additionally, there must be clear, definite
and reliable evidence showing a direct causal connection between the alleged malpractice
and damage. "In Utah, causation or connection between fault and damages in legal
malpractice actions 'cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture.'" Id. at 1291
(quoting Dunn. 594 P.2d at 896).
Summary judgment is appropriate when evidence on causation is undisputed,
or when a plaintiff does not present the type of evidence necessary to establish a direct
causal connection between malpractice and actual damages. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d
-10-

433,439 (Utah 1996). See also. Mitchell v. Parsons Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah
1985) (" [Demonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is
not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes direct
causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.").
The trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on Appellants' lost
sign revenue claim. There is no evidence any action or inaction by Mitchell caused such
damages. Neither the Kitchens nor Utah Sign could have lawfully erected the outdoor
advertising sign on the Kitchen Property from which they claim to have lost revenue.
B.

Law Regulating the Erection of Outdoor Advertising Signs
The version of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act in effect when Reagan

obtained relevant UDOT permits appeared at Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.1, et seg. (1989
& Supp. 1994) ("Outdoor Advertising Act").3 The Outdoor Advertising Act vested the Utah
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") with the authority to regulate outdoor advertising
and to adopt regulatory rules and rules for the administration and enforcement of the
Outdoor Advertising Act. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.6. The versions of the Outdoor
Advertising Act and UDOT rules applicable to the claims in this case are reproduced in
Addendum 1.

3

A11 citations within this brief to the Outdoor Advertising Act and rules are to
versions in effect through September 30, 1994. In 1998 the Outdoor Advertising Act
was renumbered effective March 21, 1998 as Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-501, et seg.
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The provisions of the Outdoor Advertising Act and UDOT rules relevant to
this case are:

C.

•

A UDOT permit must be obtained prior to the erection of an outdoor
advertising sign. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.7(1).

•

The Outdoor Advertising Act defines as unlawful the erection of an
outdoor advertising sign in the absence of a UDOT permit. Utah Code
Ann. §27-12-136.9.

•

The owner of a conforming outdoor advertising sign may relocate the
sign upon the granting by UDOT of a written request for such
relocation. Ut. Admin. Code R 933-2-5(e).

•

No outdoor advertising sign may be erected or maintained within 500
feet of an existing sign. Ut. Code Ann. § 27-12-136.5(2)(a).

Reagan Had a Valid Permit to Relocate its Sign to the Doctorman
Property Which Precluded Appellants from Erecting the Sign from
Which They Claim to Have Lost Revenue
Appellants raise numerous issues they believe create questions of material fact.

They do not create questions of material fact.

Much of what Appellants raise is

inconsequential to the grounds upon which summary judgment was based. The legal
grounds for the summary judgment are clear and straight forward. The material facts are
few, and remain undisputed. The law and facts are:

-12-

LAW

UNDISPUTED FACT

No outdoor sign may be erected or
maintained without a UDOT -*
permit.
(U.C.A. § 27-12-136.7(1))

Reagan held a UDOT permit to
maintain a sign on the Kitchen
Property through September 30,
1994.

UDOT may authorize relocation of
a sign.
-*
(Utah Admin. Code R 933-25(e))

On September 28, 1994 UDOT
granted Reagan's request to
relocate its sign to the Doctorman
Property.

No sign may be erected or
maintained within 500 feet of an ->
existing sign.
(U.C.A. § 27-12-136.5)

The Kitchen Property is within 500
feet of Reagan's sign on the
Doctorman Property.

In 1981 UDOT issued to Reagan, as sign owner, a permit to erect and maintain
an outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen Property. It is undisputed Reagan had the right
to occupy the Kitchen Property through September 30,1994. After the initial 20 year term
of the Reagan Lease expired in August, 1993, Reagan continued to pay rent and maintained
its sign on the Kitchen Property on a month-to-month basis. The Kitchens did not terminate
the tenancy until the effective date of September 30, 1994.
On September 24, 1994, Reagan applied for a permit to relocate its sign 166
feet south to the Doctorman Property. Reagan's request to relocate the sign was granted on
September 28, 1994. Reagan thereafter erected a sign on the Doctorman Property.
It has never been disputed that Reagan's sign on the Doctorman Property is
less than 500 feet from where Appellants desired to erect a sign (it is approximately 166
feet). Accordingly, the 500 foot prohibition contained in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act
-13-

and UDOT rules adopted pursuant thereto precluded the Kitchens' or Utah Sign from
obtaining a UDOT permit to lawfully erect a sign on the Kitchen Property. Utah Sign's
October 10,1994 application for a UDOT permit to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property was
appropriately denied, for among other reasons, violation of the 500 foot prohibition set forth
in § 27-12-136.5(2)(a). (R. 323, 329 and 331).
Had Mitchell obtained a dismissal of the Underlying Action, as Appellants'
claim he should have, Appellants still would have been precluded from erecting a sign on
the Kitchen Property. The issues in the Underlying Action were not whether Reagan could
lawfully maintain its sign on the Kitchen Property through September 30,1994, but whether
Reagan had renewed the Reagan Lease for an additional 20 year term and whether Utah
Sign's cutting down of the Reagan Sign constituted forcible entry entitling Reagan to a
damage award. (R. 320-323, 473-483, 945-950).
D.

Reagan's UDOT Permit Authorizing the Relocation of its Sign was Valid
Appellants challenge on several grounds the validity of Reagan's UDOT

permit to relocate its sign. All challenges are unavailing. First, appellant's fail to appreciate
that in support of his motion Mitchell introduced UDOT records including the relocation
permit, and the testimony of UDOT permit officer to lay the foundation for the records.
Reagan's permit to relocate the sign is valid on its face. Appellants have produced no
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evidence that UDOT, or a Utah District Court on review, ever adjudicated Reagan's permit
to be invalid.4
Notwithstanding the absence of evidence disputing the validity of Reagan's
UDOT permit, each of Appellants challenges to the validity of the permit fails on the merits.
First, Appellants argue Reagan had no right to apply for a permit to relocate its sign because
from August, 1993 Reagan was occupying the Kitchen Property on a month-to-month
tenancy. Appellants argue that because UDOT permits are issued for a one year term, if a
sign owner does not have a lease for a term of at least one year the sign owner is not entitled
to renew its permit. This is incorrect. UDOT rules require that an applicant file written
proof of a lease or consent from a sign owner to erect the sign at the time of the application
for an original permit. The rules do not require that the lease be for a specified term. The
rules further state that at the time of subsequent renewals of the permit, the applicant must
merely certify that the sign site is still under a valid lease. It does not require that the lease
be for any specified term. Ut. Admin. Code R. 933-2-4(11).5
4

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.9(4) provides that the district courts shall have
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final orders of UDOT under the Outdoor
Advertising Act resulting from formal or informal adjudicative proceedings.
5

R. 933-2-4 reads in full:
(11) Written proof of a lease or consent from site owner to
erect or maintain an outdoor advertising sign must be
furnished by the applicant at the time of application for an
original permit. This proof may consist of an affidavit
showing the landowner's name and address, the owner's
name, and the sign location by route, mile post, address, and
-15-

It remains undisputed that for over one year before Reagan applied for the
permit to relocate its sign, Reagan was lawfully maintaining its sign on the Kitchen Property
under a month-to-month tenancy. This month-to-month tenancy was terminated by the
Kitchens effective September 30,1994. Accordingly, on September 24,1994 when Reagan
applied for the relocation permit Reagan had a lawful right to do so - - which application
UDOT granted on September 28, 1994.
Second, Appellants argue that Reagan was precluded from obtaining the
UDOT relocation permit because on September 2, 1994 Utah Sign received a South Salt
Lake City building permit which Utah Sign claims allowed it to erect a sign on the Kitchen
Property.6 This argument is erroneous. First, whether or not the South Salt Lake City
building permit issued to Utah Sign was valid, it did not entitle Utah Sign to erect a sign on
the Kitchen Property. A UDOT permit is required before an outdoor advertising sign can

county. On renewal of the permit the applicant must certify
that the sign site is still under valid lease to the applicant.
Ut. Admin. Code R 933-2-411.
6

The South Salt Lake City building permit did not actually authorize Utah Sign to
erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen property. The application submitted by
Utah Sign states that only a "new face on existing sign" would be erected. Of course, the
existing sign was not Utah Sign's sign, but Reagan's sign. When South Salt Lake City
became aware that Utah Sign had cut down Reagan's sign and erected a new structure, it
revoked the building permit issued to Utah Sign because the work went beyond the scope
applied for in the permit. (R. 565, 689). Appellants are correct in pointing out that
thereafter South Salt Lake lifted the stop order it had placed on the erection of the sign
pursuant to the revocation of the building permit. However, the "validity" of the South
Salt Lake City building permit is completely immaterial to whether or not Reagan had a
valid UDOT permit to relocate its sign to the Doctorman Property.
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be erected. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.7(1). It is unlawful to erect a sign without a
UDOT permit. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.9. The supremacy of the Outdoor Advertising
Act and UDOT permits over building permits issued by local authorities is made clear in Ut.
Admin. Code R. 933-2-5(16) which reads:
Where local authority has issued a building permit for
construction of a sign, but such construction is contrary to the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, the action of the local authority
does not require the State to issue a permit.
Similarly, because holding a South Salt Lake City building permit did not
entitle Utah Sign to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property, Reagan was not precluded by
reason of the 500 foot prohibition from obtaining a UDOT permit to relocate its sign. At
the time Reagan obtained the permit there was no other sign on the Kitchen Property or any
other property within 500 feet of Reagan's sign. No one, including the Kitchens and Utah
Sign, had a UDOT permit authorizing it to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property or any place
within 500 feet of where Reagan relocated its sign on the Doctorman Property.
Next, there is no factual or legal basis for Appellants' claim that the South Salt
Lake City building permit issued to Reagan authorizing the relocation of its sign was or is
invalid because Reagan "misrepresented' that the sign on the Kitchen Property "would come
down." First, appellants present no admissible evidence of any misrepresentation by Reagan
to South Salt Lake City. The portion of the record cited to by Appellants in their brief does
not contain such evidence. The fact that Reagan may have represented to South Salt Lake
City that its sign on the Kitchen Property would come down when it relocated its sign to the
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Doctorman Property is entirely reasonable. Reagan had been notified that its tenancy on the
Kitchen Property would end at the end of September, 1994; hence the reason for the
application to relocate the sign to the Doctorman Property. However, before Reagan had
the opportunity to remove its sign, on October 8,1994 Utah Sign cut down the Reagan sign
approximately three feet from the foundation of the structure and welded a Utah Sign face
to the remaining structure. Therefore, Reagan's sign did "come down". The sign that
remained on the Kitchen Property after Reagan obtained the South Salt Lake City permit
was erected by Utah Sign, not Reagan.7
Finally, there is no validity to Appellants' claim that Mitchell's alleged failure
to timely dispose of the Underlying Action prevented Utah Sign from obtaining a UDOT
permit to erect a sign on the Kitchen Property. First, Appellants fail to state how Mitchell's
alleged failure in this regard prevented Utah Sign from obtaining a UDOT permit.
In any event, the Underlying Action Mitchell allegedly perpetuated does not
create a question of material fact. The dispute in the Underlying Action was whether
Reagan had exercised its option to renew the lease for another 20 year term, not whether
Reagan was lawfully occupying the Kitchen Property on a month-to-month basis after the
expiration of the original 20 year lease term. It is undisputed that from August, 1993

Notwithstanding the absence of a valid UDOT permit, under the terms of a
temporary restraining order issued in the Underlying Action the Utah Sign sign remained
erected pending further litigation. (R. 646-648).
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through September 30, 1994 Reagan's sign remained on the Kitchen Property under a
month-to-month tenancy.
The Underlying Action allegedly perpetuated by Mitchell had no bearing on
the fact on September 28, 1994 UDOT granted Reagan's request to relocate its sign to the
Doctorman Property. Finally, the dispute Mitchell allegedly perpetuated had no bearing on
the fact that because the Reagan's sign on the Doctorman Property was within 500 feet of
the Kitchen Property, no person or entity, including the Kitchens and Utah Sign, could have
lawfully erected a sign on the Kitchen Property.10
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED UTAH SIGN'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

Expert Testimony by Attorney Gordon Roberts Supports Mitchell's
Tactical Decisions in the Underlying Case
Appellants'

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

fundamentally

misconstrued the nature of summary judgment and the bases for summary judgment on a
legal malpractice claim. The only element of a legal malpractice claim established by
Appellants was the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Appellants and
Mitchell. Appellants wholly failed to show that Mitchell breached his duty of care to
Appellants that Mitchell proximately caused them any damage.

10

Ironically, given the Appellants' malpractice claim, Mitchell prevailed at the trial
court level on the lease dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment declaring that
Reagan failed to exercise its option to renew the lease of the Kitchen Property for another
20 year term. Mitchell could not have obtained a more favorable result for Appellants on
the lease dispute. (R. 868-871).
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Appellants' brief omits expert testimony in support of its breach of duty
argument11. Without such testimony Appellants' legal malpractice claim must fail. Preston
& Chambers v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1997). In Preston & Chambers this court
confirmed that in order to prevail on all but the most obvious malpractice claims, a plaintiff
must provide expert testimony on the applicable standard of care.
In opposing Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mitchell
relied upon the expert testimony of attorney Gordon Roberts. Mr. Roberts reviewed the
pleadings, discovery materials and correspondence from the underlying case ROA
Advertising, Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen, et al. It is Mr. Roberts' opinion that in connection
with the Rule 41(a) issue, neither Mitchell nor Burbidge and Mitchell committed a breach
of the applicable standard of care which resulted in any damage to Appellants. Mr. Roberts
opines that Mitchell's tactical decision not to file a Rule 41(a) motion was sound for the
following reasons:
a.

A Rule 41(a) motion would not have succeeded in dismissing

Reagan Outdoor Advertising's ("Reagan's") claim for actual forcible entry because
the forcible entry claim was a new claim not raised in Reagan's earlier-filed cases.
b.

Reagan's claim against Appellants for breach of lease was

invalid, as witnessed by the fact the trial court eventually granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Mitchell on that claim. In granting summary judgment
n

Utah Sign has apparently abandoned the purported expert testimony of attorney
John Alex, filed in supplement to their original motion papers. R. 714-718).
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the court held that Reagan's lease had terminated. More importantly, the Motion for
Summary Judgment achieved the same result with regard to the breach of lease claim
that Appellants would have achieved by filing a Rule 41(a) motion. It is rank
speculation to suggest that the summary judgment strategy was more costly than the
Rule 41(a) strategy.
c.

Mitchell reasonably believed that a Rule 41 (a) motion would not

succeed because the trial court was unlikely to dismiss Reagan's claims with
prejudice without Reagan having had an opportunity to litigate its claims, especially
in light of the forcible entry. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment.
d.

Mitchell reasonably believed that Judge Rigtrup, before whom the case

was then pending, would be less receptive than Judge Young to Appellants' claims
because of Judge Rigtrup's obvious displeasure at Utah Sign's forcible entry upon
the Kitchen leasehold interest. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment.
(R. 629-632, See Addendum 2).
Appellants' argument that this is a res ipsa loquitur cast and requires no expert
witness testimony does not stand scrutiny. As the affidavit of Gordon Roberts makes clear,
Mitchell's decision to seek consolidation of the last two actions with the first-filed action
was a reasonable professional judgment under the circumstances. Whether to file a Rule
41(a) motion in the Underlying Case was a tactical decision. Where there are factual
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questions related to a tactical or judgmental issue, expert testimony is required. Walker v.
Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279 (Wa. 1279).
The Walker court held that in a malpractice action involving allegations of
negligence against attorneys in their handling of a longshore man's maritime personal injury
action in federal court, expert legal testimony was both proper and necessary where the case
involved allegations of negligence pertaining to trial tactics and procedure. The court also
commented that these were matters frequently difficult to prove. Id. at 1282.
Even if expert testimony were not required, Appellants' motion would fail.
Appellants reason that because Reagan voluntarily dismissed two of the actions it filed
against Appellants, the remaining action would have automatically been dismissed with
prejudice had they filed a Rule 41(a) motion. Appellants are wrong for reasons stated in the
very cases they rely upon in their brief.
In Englehart v. Bell & Howell Co., 299 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1962) the court
discusses the appropriate remedy to obtain relief from the effect of a second voluntary
dismissal: moving to set aside or vacate such dismissal. Id. at 484, citing United States v.
Beebe. 180 U.S. 343, 21 S. Ct. 371 (1901); Preveden v. Hahn. 36 F. Supp. 952 (SDNY
1941) and Levee District No. 4 of Dunklin County v. Small, 281 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App.
1955). One of the cases relied upon by Appellants makes the same observation. The court
in Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317 (1987) stated that the district court has power
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to vacate a voluntary dismissal under Rule 60(b) as long as requisite justification exists,
especially where the vacation of dismissal does not unduly prejudice a party.
In Randall plaintiff filed two complaints against Merrill Lynch and voluntarily
dismissed both of them. Plaintiff, who was certified as fully disabled by the state of
California, dismissed the two complaints because his doctor warned him that the stress
caused by the cases could result in serious physiological consequences such as a heart attack,
or stroke. After plaintiff filed a third complaint, Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 41(a), which motion was granted. The court held that although plaintiffs second
voluntary dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits, plaintiffs could seek to vacate
that dismissal pursuant to Rule 60. Id. at 1320.
Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Vacate the second dismissal. Although the
plaintiffs motion did not fall within Rule 60(b)(l)-60(b)(5), the court considered Rule
60(b)(6), which allows relief to a party from a final judgment for any reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The court decided dismissal of the complaints was not
a calculated strategic decision, but rather the result of an extreme circumstance (the
plaintiffs severe illness) beyond the plaintiff s control, which justified relieving the plaintiff
from the judgment. Id. at 1321. citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198,71
S. 0.209,212(1950).
In this case there is no evidence contained in the record as to the basis for
Reagan's decision to dismiss its first and third complaints. Because a factual void exists as
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to the bases of those dismissals, it is possible that Reagan could have moved to reinstate one
of its previously dismissed cases and thereby avoided the effect of Rule 41(a) (even if Rule
41(a) applied to Reagan's claim for actual forcible entry). Mitchell testified that one of the
reasons he did not think a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a) would be effective
against Reagan was because, even if granted, Reagan could simply move to have one of its
previously filed actions reinstated. Mitchell did not think the Third District Court would in
effect give Reagan the "death penalty" by dismissing its claims against the Utah Sign
plaintiffs with prejudice. Mitchell also believed that a Rule 41 (a) motion would fail on legal
ground inasmuch as — after Utah Sign forcibly entered the Reagan leasehold — Reagan had
a new claim that had not been alleged in the earlier cases. (R. 618-619).
In Poloron Products, Inc. v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F. 2d
1012, 1017 (2nd Cir. 1976) the court observed:
The "two dismissal" rule is an exception to the general
principle, contained in Rule 41(a)(1) and honored in equity
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules that a voluntary
dismissal of an action does not bar a new suit based upon the
same claim. 5 J.Moore, supra, para. 41.04, at 1045. Where the
purpose behind the "two dismissal" exception would not appear
to be served by its literal application, and where that
application's effect would be to close the courthouse doors to
an otherwise proper litigant, a court should be most careful not
to construe or apply the exception too broadly.
Mitchell's tactical decision to seek consolidation as opposed to dismissal is
consistent with the Poloron court's stricture about limiting the application of Rule 41(a).
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Rule 41(a) requires that for purposes of dismissal with prejudice, the same
claim must have been twice voluntarily dismissed. Wright and Miller observe:
There is surprisingly little discussion in the cases of what is "the
same claim" for purposes of Rule 41(a). . . Since the effect of
finding two dismissals to have been on the same claim is to
make the second dismissal an adjudication on the merits and
thus preclude a later suit in which the merits actually will be
tried, the courts should not extend the words "same claim"
beyond their natural meaning.
Wright and Miller § 2368, p. 329, citing Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Inc., 96 So. 2d
215, 218 (Fla. 1957).
In Crump, plaintiffs had first filed and dismissed two suits for an injunction
questioning the authority and good faith of corporate directors in proposing to issue unissued
stock and to increase the membership of the board. Plaintiffs next filed a suit alleging fraud
and mismanagement on the part of the managing director of a corporation, and praying for
an accounting, a receivership, and a dissolution of the corporation. The Crump court found
that this was not the same as the first two causes of action, "since the facts necessary to the
maintenance of [the third] suit are not essentially the same as those which would have been
relied upon to establish the right to the relief prayed for in the first suit." Id. at 218, citing
Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952). The court concluded "certainly as to these
aspects of the third suit, the voluntary dismissal of the first suit cannot operate under the two
dismissal rule as a bar to the third suit." Id.
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This case involves facts very similar to those in Crump. Reagan filed three
suits stating a cause of action for anticipated forcible entry upon its premises, based upon
correspondence received from Utah Sign's counsel. However, after Utah Sign illegally cut
down Reagan's sign in October, 1994, Reagan's forcible entry cause of action changed. The
actual forcible entry claim was not the same claim as the anticipatory claim contained in the
original three suits. This is best evidenced by Reagan's Amended Complaint in the second
filed suit, which specifically pleads the facts of Utah Sign's actual forcible entry and a cause
of action based on those facts. (See Addendum 4).
Appellants argue that Rule 41(a)'s adjudication upon the merits "is dispositive,
not only of the claims actually brought in the dismissed actions but those issues and claims
that could have been litigated as well." (Appellants' Brief at 12, citing Searle Brothers v.
Searie, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). Appellants ignore the fact that Rule 41(a) makes
no mention whatsoever of adjudicating claims "that could have been litigated." Rather,
41(a) adjudicates upon the merits "an action based on or including the same claim."
Appellants' argument conflates two very different juridical principles: the specific, narrow
statutory enactment of Rule 41(a) and the broad common law principle of res judicata.
As argued supra. Rule 41(a) should be strictly construed since it is in
derogation of a previously existing right. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to expand
Rule 41(a)'s scope to issues and claims "that could have been litigated" in voluntarily
dismissed actions. Dismissal of Reagan's first and third-filed suits could not have triggered
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Rule 41(a) because Reagan's Amended Complaint in the second-filed suit was not based on
the same facts driving the original three suits.
Appellants' conclusory, unsupported statements about what Mitchell should
have done constitute nothing more than disagreement about litigation tactics. Courts have
recognized that attorneys are not liable for legal malpractice where the proper course is open
to reasonable doubt. See e.g., Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., P.C., 160 A.D. 2d 428, 554
N.Y.S.2d487(1990).
B.

The Trial Court's Subjective Opinion About How it Would Have Ruled
if Presented With Certain Facts in the Underlying Case is Irrelevant and
Inadmissible
Utah Sign claims:
The trial court, when belatedly presented with a motion brought
under [Rule 41a] after Mitchell's termination and replacement
in the case, recognized the simplicity and efficacy of the rule
and acknowledged that he would have implemented its
provisions and dismissed the R.O.A. claims but for Mitchells
[sic] own conduct in seeking reinstatement and consolidation
of the dismissed complaint thereby negligently subjecting his
clients to litigation of barred claims. (Quotation omitted).

(Utah's Sign's Brief, p. 14, emphasis in original).
For purposes of proving proximate cause in a legal malpractice case the
plaintiff must objectively show that absent the attorney's negligence, the underlying action
would have been successful. In Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) the Utah
Supreme Court explained this means establishing what the result of the underlying action
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should have been, which is an objective standard, rather than what a particular judge or jury
would have decided, which is a subjective standard.
In Harline, the defendant attorneys successfully argue that they were not the
proximate cause of plaintiff Harline's denial of discharge in bankruptcy. The Supreme
Court held that the Bankruptcy Court's determination that Harline had acted fraudulently
and should be denied discharge precluded Harline from relitigating the cause of his denial
of discharge in the malpractice action. However, in so ruling, the Utah Supreme Court held
that the trial court erred in admitting subjective opinion testimony from the bankruptcy judge
who presided over the original case as to how that judge would have ruled absent the alleged
negligence of the defendant attorney.12
The Supreme Court's opinion in Harline v. Barker makes clear that
Appellants' attempted use of the trial court's subjective opinion is in the Underlying Action
improper. Such evidence would be irrelevant and inadmissible at trial and was properly
disregarded by the court in considering Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

12

The Utah Supreme Court also held that admission of the subjective opinion
testimony was harmless error where plaintiff failed to show that the defendant attorney
caused plaintiff's denial of discharge in the underlying bankruptcy cases.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision granting appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.

DATED this25 day of January, 2002.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK
KIRK G. GIBBS
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants
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UTAH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ACT

27-12-136.4

HIGHWAYS

(24) (a) "Unzoned commercial or industrial area" means:
(i) those areas not zoned by state law or local law, regulation,
or ordinance t h a t are occupied by one or more industrial or
commercial activities other than outdoor advertising signs;
(ii) the lands along the highway for a distance of 600 feet
immediately adjacent to those activities; and
(iii) lands covering the same dimensions t h a t are directly
opposite those activities on the other side of the highway, if the
department determines t h a t those lands on the opposite side of
the highway do not have scenic or aesthetic value.
(b) In measuring the scope of the unzoned commercial or industrial
area, all measurements shall be made from the outer edge of the
regularly used buildings, parking lots, storage, or processing areas of
the activities and shall be along or parallel to the edge of pavement of
the highway.
• (c) All signs located within an unzoned commercial or industrial
area become nonconforming if the commercial or industrial activity
used in defining the area ceases for a continuous period of 12 months.
(25) "Urbanized county" means a county with a population of at least
125,000 persons.
H i s t o r y : L- 1967, c h . 5 1 , § 3; 1971, c h . 6 1 ,
§ 2; 1981, c h . 136, § 1; 1988, c h . 239, § 1;
1988 ( 2 n d S.S.), c h . 5, § 1; 1994, c h . 12, § 26.

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected the references in Subsection (4).

27-12-136.4. Advertising prohibited near interstate or
primary s y s t e m — Exceptions — Logo advertising — Permits required in certain cases — Department rules.
(1) Outdoor advertising t h a t is capable of being read or comprehended from
any place on the main-traveled way of an interstate or primary system may not
be erected or maintained, except:
(a) directional and other official signs and notices authorized or required by law, including signs and notices pertaining to natural wonders
and scenic and historic attractions, informational or directional signs
regarding utility service, emergency telephone signs, buried or underground utility markers, and above ground utility closure signs;
(b) signs advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they are
located;
(c) signs advertising activities conducted on the property where they
are located;
(d) signs located in a commercial or industrial zone;
(e) signs located in unzoned industrial or commercial areas as determined from actual land uses; and
(f) logo advertising under Subsection (2).
(2) (a) The department may itself or by contract erect, administer, and
maintain informational signs on the main-traveled way of an interstate or
primary system for the display of logo advertising and information of
interest to the traveling public if:
228

HIGHWAY CODE

27-12-1;

(I) the department complies with Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah J
curement Code, in the lease or other contract agreement wit
private party for the sign or sign space; and
(ii) the private party for the lease of the sign or sign space payg
amount set by the department to be paid to the department or
party under contract with the department under this subsection.
(b) The amount shall be sufficient to cover the costs of erecti
administering, and maintaining t h e signs or sign spaces.
(c) The department may consult the Division of Travel Developmem
carrying out this subsection.
(3) (a) Revenue generated under Subsection (2) shall be:
(i) applied first to cover department costs under Subsection (2); a
(ii) deposited in the Transportation Fund,
(b) Revenue in excess of costs under Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposil
in the General Fund as a dedicated credit for use by the Division of Tra
Development no later than the following fiscal year.
(4) Outdoor advertising under Subsections (l)(a), (d), (e), and (f) sh
conform to the rules made by the department under Sections 27-12-136.6 a
27-12-136.7.
H i s t o r y : L. 1967, c h . 5 1 , § 4; 1971, c h . 6 1 ,
§ 3; 1981, c h . 136, § 2; 1989, ch- 144, § 1;
1991, c h . 137, § 47; 1994, c h . 120, § 39.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsections (lXf), (2) and (3) relating to logo advertising; designated former Subsection (2) as (4) and
rewrote t h e subsection which read. "Outdoor
advertising authorized under Subsections
(l)(a), (d), and (e) of this section shall conform
to the standards and bear permits as required
by regulations promulgated by the department"; and made numerous stylistic changes.

The 1991 amendment, effective April
1991, substituted "commission* for "depa
ment" a t the end of Subsection (4) and ma
stylistic and punctuation changes in Subsi
tions (l)Ca) and (2)(a).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,19$
substituted "Code" for "Act" in Subsecti
(2)(a)(i), subdivided Subsection (3)(a); in Su
section (3)(a), substituted "Subsection (2)H f
"Subsection (2)(a)" twice; substituted "depai
ment" for "commission" and added the secti<
citations in Subsection (4); and made stylist
changes.

27-12-136.5. Sign size — Sign spacing — Location in oiil
door advertising corridor — Limit on implemen
tation.
(1) Sign size:
(a) No sign face within the state shall exceed the following limits:
(i) maximum area — 1000 square feet;
(ii) maximum length — 60 feet; and
(iii) maximum height — 25 feet.
(b) No more than two facings visible and readable from the sami
direction on the main-traveled way may be erected on any one sigi
structure. Whenever two facings are so positioned, neither shall exceec
325 square feet.
(c; Double-faced, back-to-back, and V-type signs are permitted as £
single sign or structure if both faces enjoy common ownership.
(2) Sign spacing:
(a) Any sign allowed to be erected by reason of the exceptions set forth
in Subsection 27-12-136.4(1) or in H-l zones shall not be closer than 50C
feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway oi
limited access primary highway, except t h a t signs may be erected closer
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than 500 feet if the signs on the same side of the interstate highway 0 r
limited access primary highway are not simultaneously visible.
(b) Signs may not be located within 500 feet of any of the following
which are adjacent to the highway, unless the signs are in an incorporated
area:
(i) public parks;
(ii) public forests;
(hi) public playgrounds;
(iv) areas designated as scenic areas by the department or other
state agency having and exercising this authority; or
(v) cemeteries.
(c) (i) Except under Subsection (ii), signs may not be located on an
interstate highway or limited access highway on the primary system
within 500 feet of an interchange, or intersection at grade, or rest area
• measured along t h e interstate highway or freeway from the sign to
the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way.
(ii) A sign may be placed closer than 500 feet from the nearest point
of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or
entrance to the main-traveled way, if:
(A) the sign is at least 500 feet but not more t h a n 2,640 feet
from the nearest point of the intersecting highway of the interchange; and
(B) the section of interstate highway or freeway was opened for
use by the traveling public on or after September 1, 1987.
(d) The location of signs situated on nonlimited access primary highways in commercial, industrial, or H-l zoned areas between streets, roads,
or highways entering the primary highway shall not exceed the following
minimum spacing criteria:
(i) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets,
roads, or highways is less t h a n 1000 feet, a minimum spacing between
structures of 150 feet may be permitted between the intersecting
streets or highways.
(ii) Where the distance between centerlines of intersecting streets,
roads, or highways is 1000 feet or more, minimum spacing between
sign structures shall be 300 feet.
(e) All outdoor advertising shall be erected and maintained within the
outdoor advertising corridor.
(3) Subsection (2)(c)(ii) may not be implemented until:
(a) the Utah-Federal Agreement for carrying out national policy relative to control of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the national
system of interstate and defense highways and the federal-aid primary
system is modified to allow the sign placement specified in Subsection
(2)(c)(ii); and
(b) the modified agreement under Subsection (a) is signed on behalf of
both the state and the United States Secretary of Transportation.
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 5; 1971, ch. 61,
§ 4; 1981, ch. 136, § 3; 1989, ch. 144, § 2;
1991, ch. 137, § 48.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted subsec-

tion designation (2)(c)(i) and substituted aExcept under Subsection (2)(c)(n), signs may not"
for "No sign may* at the beginning thereof,
added Subsections (2XcXn) and (3), and made
stylistic changes.
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The 1991 amendment, effective April 2S,
991, deleted M(d) or (e)* in the subsection

reference m Subsection (2)(a) and mad
changes m punctuation and phraseology.

57-12-136.6. Advertising — Regulatory power of depart
ment.
In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking
^ct, the department may make rules no more restrictive than this chapter to
(1) control the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising alon§
the interstate and primary highway systems;
(2) provide for enforcement of this chapter;
(3) establish the form, content, and submittal of applications to ered
outdoor advertising; and
(4) establish administrative procedures.
History; L. 1967, ch. 51, § 6; 1971, ch- 61,
i 5; 1981, ch. 136, § 4; 1990, ch. 300, § 2;
L991, ch. 137, § 49; 1994, ch. 120, § 40.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendnent, effective April 23, 1990, divided the fornerly undivided language into an introductory
jaragraph and Subsections (1) and (2); rewrote
,he introductory paragraph which read "The
iepartment is hereby authorized to make and
promulgate regulations to deleted signs displays, and devices after advertising and con-

sistent with and no more restrictive than" aftei
"systems" in Subsection CD; added "provide foi
enforcement oP at the beginning of Subsection
(2); and added Subsections (3) and (4)
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
199iy substituted "commission" for "departm ent" and made a minor stylistic change.
T h e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t j effective May 2,1994,
s u b s t l t u t e d "department" for "commission" m
the mtroductoiy ianguage.

27-12-136.7, Advertising. — Permits — Application requirements — Duration — Fees,
(1) (a) Outdoor advertising may not be maintained without a current
permit.
(b) Applications for permits shall be made to the department on forms
furnished by it.
(c) A permit must be' obtained prior to installing each outdoor sign.
(d) The application for a permit shall be accompanied by an initial fee
established under Section 63-38-3.2.
(2) (a) Each permit issued by the department expires on June 30 of each
year.
(b) Each permit may be renewed for a period of one year upon the filing
of a renewal application and payment of a renewal fee established under
Section 63-38-3.2.
(3) Sign owners residing outside the state shall provide the department with
a continuous performance bond in the amount of $2,500.
(4) Fees may not be prorated for fractions of the permit period. Advertising
copy may be changed at any time without payment of an additional fee.
(5) (a) Each sign shall have its permit continuously affixed to the sign in a
position visible from the nearest traveled portion of the highway.
(b) The permit shall be affixed to the sign within 30 days of the
installation date.
History: L. 1987, ch. 51, § 7; 1971, ch. 51,
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend§ 6; 1981, ch. 136, § 5; 1990, ch. 300, § 3; ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, subdivided the
1991, ch. 137, ^ 50; 1994, ch. 120, § 41.
section; rewrote Subsection (l)(a); substituted
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"Department of Transportation" for "depaitment" in Subsection (l)(b), inserted "outdoor" in
Subsection (l)(c); in Subsection (l)(d), added
the second sentence and substituted the Ianguage beginning "determined by rule" for "of
$15" in the first sentence, deleted a following
paragraph, relating to the validity of permits,
substituted "permit issued by the Department
of Transportation expires" for "annual permit
issued by t h e department shall expire" in Subsection (2)(a), in Subsection (2)(b), added the
second sentence and substituted the phrase
beginning "renewal fee determined by rule" for
M
$5 renewal fee" m the first sentence; substituted "residing outside the state shall provide
the Department of Transportation" for "located
outside the s t a t e of Utah m u s t provide the
department" in Subsection (3); made minor
stylistic changes in Subsection (4); substituted
"Department of Transportation" for "department" and "installation" for "erection" and
made stylistic changes in Subsection (5), substituted "installation" for "construction" in Sub-

section (6), and rewrote Subjection (7), which
read "Signs lawfully in place on the effective
date of this act shall have permits continuously
displayed thereon "
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, substituted "department" for "Department of Transportation" in Subsections (l)(b),
(2)(a), (3) and (5), substituted "commission" for
"Department of Transportation" in Subsections
(l)(d) and (2)(b), and made minor stylistic
changes
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "prior to installing" for "for" m
Subsection (l)(c), replacing the provisions of
deleted Subsection (6), substituted "established
under Section 63-38-3 2" for "determined by
rule of the commission in accordance with Title
63, Chapter
46a, Utah
Administrative
Rulemaking Act The fee shall be reasonable
and fair and shall reflect the cost of t h e service
provided" in Subsections (l)(d) and (2)(b), and
rewrote Subsection (5) to incorporate deleted
Subsection (7)

27-12-136.8. Repealed.
R e p e a l s . — Laws 1990, ch. 300, § 5 repeals
§ 27-12-136.8, as last amended by Laws 1981,

ch 136, § 6, relating to notice of a violation to
the holder of a permit, effective April 23, 1990

27-12-136.9. Unlawful outdoor advertising — Adjudicative proceedings — Judicial review — Costs of
removal — Civil and criminal liability for damaging regulated signs — Immunity for Department of Transportation.
(1) Outdoor advertising is unlawful when:
(a) erected after May 9, 1967, contrary to the provisions of this chapter;
(b) a permit is not obtained as required by this chapter;
(c) a false or misleading statement h a s been made in the application for
a permit t h a t was material to obtaining t h e permit; or
(d) the sign for which a permit was issued is not in a reasonable state
of repair, is unsafe, or is otherwise in violation of this chapter.
(2) The establishment, operation, repair, maintenance, or alteration of any
sign contrary to this chapter is also a public nuisance.
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (4), in its enforcement of this section,
the Department of Transportation shall comply with the procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act.
(4) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final orders of the Department of Transportation under this section
resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings.
(b) Venue for judicial review of final orders of the Department of
Transportation shall be in the county in which the sign is located.
(5) If the Department of Transportation is granted a judgment, the Department of Transportation is entitled to have any nuisance abated and recover
from the responsible person, firm, or corporation, jointly and severally:
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the sign; and
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(b) $10 for each day the sign was maintained following the expirat
ten days after notice of agency action was filed and served under Si
63-46b-3.
(6) (a) Any person, partnership, firm, or corporation who vandalizes,
ages, defaces, destroys, or uses any sign controlled under this ch
without the owner's permission is liable to the owner of the sign for \
the amount of damage sustained and all costs of court, includ
reasonable attorney's fee, and is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(b) This subsection does not apply to the department, its agen
employees if acting to enforce this chapter.
H i s t o r y : L. 1967, ch. 51, § 9,- 1971, c h . 6 1 ,
§ 8; 1981, c h . 136, § 7; 1987, c h . 161, § 67;
1990, c h . 300, 5 4.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1990 amendment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, substituted
present Subsections (l)(c) and (lXd) for former
Subsection (lXc), which read "when a permittee
fails to comply with a notice of violation as
provided m Section 27-12-136 8," and rewrote
the remaining language in Subsection (1); inserted present Subsection (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3)

and, in t h a t subsection, added "Except s
vided m Subsection (4), in its enforcem
this section" at the beginning and subst
"the Administrative Procedures Act" for
adjudicative proceedings"; substituted p
Subsection (4) for former Subsection (3),
m g to the same subject matter, and d
former Subsection (4); inserted present Si
tion (5); redesignated former Subsection
present Subsection (6); and substituted
section does not" for "paragraph shall u
construed to" in Subsection (6)(b).

27-12-136.10. Existing outdoor advertising not in coni
mity with act — When removal required.
Any outdoor advertising lawfully in existence along the interstate or
primary systems on the effective date of this act and which is not the
conformity with its provisions is not required to be removed until five y<
after it becomes nonconforming or pursuant to the provisions of Sec
27-12-136.11.
H i s t o r y : L. 1967, ch. 5 1 , 4 10; 1981, c h .
136, § 8; 1992, ch. 30, § 60.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective April 27,1992, deleted u; ex
for violations of Section 27-12-136.8" after u
conforming."

27-12-136.11. Existing outdoor advertising not in conf
mity with act — Procedure — Eminent domain
Compensation.
(1) The department is hereby empowered and authorized to acquire by g
purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent -domain, any existing outd
advertising and all property rights pertaining to same which were lawfull}
existence on May 9, 1967, and which by reason of this chapter beco
nonconforming.' If the department, or any town, city, county, governmen
entity, public utility, or any agency or the United States Department
Transportation under this chapter, prevents the maintenance as defined
Section 27-12-136.3 or requires that maintenance of an existing sign
discontinued, the sigh in question shall be considered acquired by such ent
and just compensation will become immediately due and payable. Emin(
domain shall be exercised in accordance with the provision of Title 78, Chap
34.
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(2) J u s t compensation shall be paid for outdoor advertising and all property
rights pertaining to the same, including the right of the landowner upon whose
land a sign is located, acquired through the processes of eminent domain. For
the purposes of this act, just compensation shall include the consideration of
damages to remaining-properties, contiguous and noncontiguous, of an outdoor
advertising sign company's interest, which remaining properties, together
with the properties actually condemned, constituted an economic unit. The
department is empowered to remove signs found in violation of Section
27-12-136.9 without payment of any compensation.
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to permit a person to place or
maintain any outdoor advertising adjacent to any interstate or primary,
highway system which is prohibited by law or by any town, city, or county
ordinance. Any town, city, county, governmental entity, or public utility which
requires the removal, relocation, alteration, change, or termination of outdoor
advertising shall pay j u s t compensation as defined in this chapter and in Title
78, Chapter 34.
Except as provided in Section 27-12-136.9, no sign shall be required to be
removed by' the department nor sign maintenance as described in Section
27-12-136.11 discontinued unless at the time of removal or discontinuance
there are sufficient funds, from whatever source, appropriated and immediately available to pay the just compensation required under this section and
unless at t h a t time the federal funds required to be contributed under Section
131 of Title 23, United States Code, if any, with respect to the outdoor
advertising being removed, have been appropriated and are immediately
available to this state. '

(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administral
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules to regulate the creat
and maintenance of junk or salvage yards within 660 feet of the right
way of designated federal and state highways outside the jurisdictio
limits of cities and towns.

27-12-137

History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 11; 1971, ch. 61,
§ 9; 1981, ch. 136, § 9; 1989, ch. 22, § 7; 1992,
ch. 30, § 61.
Amendment Notes. —- The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, made stylistic
changes in the statutory references and also
made punctuation changes.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,

1992, deleted "Section 27-12-136.8 or* before
"Section 27-12-136.9" in the last sentence of
Subsections (2) and (3).
Meaning of "this act.* — The phrase "this
act," in the second sentence in Subsection (2),
m e a n s L. 1967, ch. 51, which enacted §§ 27-121 3 6 < 1 t o 27-12-136.13. '

27-12-137. Dump grounds, junk, or salvage yards adjacent to highways — Regulation authorized —
Definitions.
(1) (a) In this section, "junk yard" or "salvage yard" means any establishment having as an integral part any open display, accumulation, or
collection of discarded, worn out, or abandoned material which may or
may not be put to some use or have some value, which is offered for sale,
trade in whole or in part, or kept for storage.
(b) J u n k or salvage yards include: automobile wrecking or salvage
yards; war surplus yards; yards collecting and displaying worn-out machinery, equipment, or appliances; and city or town dumps for waste
material and garbage,
(2) (a) A city or town may adopt ordinances to regulate the creation or
maintenance of dump grounds and junk or salvage yards of any type
within 660 feet of the right-of-way of designated state and federal
highways within the jurisdictional limits of the adopting city or town.
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History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 137; 1965, ch.
53, § 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 51; 1994, ch. 120,
§ 42.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the
section; substituted "The department may" for
"It shall be within the power of the state of
Utah, by and through its road commission, to"
at the beginning of Subsection (1Kb); and made

27-12-1S

stylistic changes and changes in phraseo
and punctuation.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1
rewrote former Subsection (1) as present £
section (2), deleting a purpose clause from i
section (a) and adding the code citatiot
Subsection (b), redesignated former Subsec
(2) as Subsection (1), and made styl
changes.

27-12-137.3, Definitions.
As used in Sections 27-12-137.3 through 27-12-137.13:
(1) "Automobile graveyard" means any establishment or place of bi
ness which is maintained, used, or operated for storing, keeping, buyi
or selling wrecked, scrapped, ruined, or dismantled motor vehicles
motor vehicle parts.
(2) "Interstate system" means that portion of the national defei
system of interstate and defense highways located within this st
officially designated pursuant to Title 23, United States Code, Highwa
(3) "Junk" means old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, z
paper; trash; rubber debris; waste; junked, dismantled, or wrecked an
mobiles or parts thereof; and iron, steel, and other old or scrap ferrous
nonferrous material.
(4) "Junkyard" means any place, establishment, or business ma
tained, used, or operated for storing, keeping, buying, or selling junk,
for t h e maintenance or operation of an automobile graveyard, and 1
term includes garbage dumps, recycling facilities, garbage process
facilities, and sanitary land fills.
(5) "Primary system" means t h a t portion of connected main highwj
located within this state officially designated pursuant to Title 23, Unii
States Code, Highways.
History; L. 1967, ch. 52, § 3; 1991, ch. 137,
§ 52; 1994, ch. 120, § 43.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, substituted "Sections 27-12-137.3 through 27-12-137.13" for
"this act" at the beginning of the section; rearranged the subsections in alphabetical order;
inserted "recycling facilities, garbage processing facilities" and inserted "land" before "fills"

in present Subsection (4); deleted former £
section (6) defining "commission"; and m
changes in punctuation and phraseology,
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 15
i n Subsections (2) and (5), deleted "by
commission and approved by the secret;
after "designated" and added "Highways" to
en(j

27-12-137.4. License required.
A person may not establish, operate, or maintain a junkyard, any portior
which is within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of\ a
interstate or primary highway, without obtaining a license to do so from 1
department.
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R933. Preconstruction, Right of Way
Acquisition.
R933-1. Right of Way Acquisition.
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs.
R933-3. Relocation or Modification of Existing Authorized
Access Openings or Granting New Access Openings on
Limited Access Highways.

R933-1. Right of Way Acquisition.
R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquisition Incorporation of Federal Publication.
R933-1-1. Right of Way A c q u i s i t i o n Incorporat i o n of F e d e r a l P u b l i c a t i o n .
The State of U t a h incorporates by reference 49
CFR 24 as amended in the Federal Register, March
2, 1989, as its administrative rules on the acquisition of rights of way.
References: 27-12-89 through 103.
History: 13864, AMD, 01/14/93.
R933-2. Control of Outdoor
Signs.

Advertising

R933-2-1. Purpose.
R933-2-2. Federal Regulations.
R933-2-3. Definitions.
R933-2-4. Permits.
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance.
R933-2-6. Commercial and Industrial Usage: Limitations
in Zoned or Unzoned Areas.
R933-2-7. Spacing For Permitted Signs.
R933-2-8. Removal of Illegal Signs.
R933-2-9. Termination of Non-Conforming Use Status.
R933-2-10. Conforming Sign Becoming Nonconforming —
Removal.
R933-2-11. On-Premise Signs — Illegal Status — Removal.
R933-2-12. Directional Signs.
R933-2-13. Official Signs.
R933-2-14. Department Hearings.
R933-2-15. Prosecution for Violation of Act or Rules.
R933-2-16. Saving Clause.
R933-2-17. Effective Date.
R933-2-1. P u r p o s e .
The purpose of these rules is to implement t h e
U t a h Outdoor Advertising Act. Nothing in these
rules shall be construed to permit outdoor advertising t h a t would disqualify t h e State for Federal
participation of funds under t h e Federal standards
applicable. The Transportation Commission and the
U t a h Department of Transportation shall, through
designated personnel, control outdoor advertising on
interstate and primary highway systems.
R933-2-2. F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n s .
The federal regulations governing outdoor advertising contained in 23 CFR section 750.101 through
section 750.713 (April 1, 1994) are adopted and
incorporated by this reference.
J a n u a r y 1,1996
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R933-2-3. Definitions.
All references in these Rules to Sections 27-12136.1 through 27-12-136.13, are to those sections of
the U t a h Code known as t h e U t a h Outdoor Advertising Act. In addition to t h e definitions in Section
27-12-136.3, the following definitions a r e supplied:
(1) "Abandoned Sigh" means any controlled sign,
the sign facing of which h a s been partially obliterated, h a s been painted out, h a s remained blank or
has obsolete advertising m a t t e r for a continuous
period of twelve (12) months or more.
(2) "Act" means the U t a h Outdoor Advertising
(3) "Advertising" means any message, w h e t b
words, symbols, pictures or any combination the
painted or otherwise applied to t h e face of an
door advertising structure, which message is
signed, intended, or used to advertise or inform,
which message is visible from any place on the i
travel-way of t h e interstate or primary high
system.
(4) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of
door advertising" as used in Subsection 2rt
136.3(3) of the Act is defined to include area
which the primary activity is outdoor advertish
(5) "Commercial or industrial zone" as define
Subsection 27-12-136.3(2)(d) of t h e Act is further
defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside
the boundaries of urbanized counties and outside
the boundaries of cities and towns referred to in t h a t
subsection, such areas not within 8420 feet of an
interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as
measured from the nearest point of t h e beginning or
ending of the pavement widening at t h e exit from or
entrance to the main traveled way t h a t are reserved
for business, commerce, or t r a d e under enabling
state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations, and are actually used for
commercial or industrial purposes, including the
land along both sides of a controlled highway for 600
feet immediately abutting the area of use, measurements under this subsection being m a d e from the
outer edge of regularly used buildings, parking lots,
gate-houses, entrance gates, or storage or processing
areas.
(6) "Conforming Sign* m e a n s an off-premise sign
maintained in a location t h a t conforms to the size,
lighting, spacing, zoning and usage requirements as
provided by law and these rules.
(7) "Controlled Sign" means any off-premise sign
t h a t is designed, intended, or used to advertise or
inform any part of the advertising or informative
contents of which is visible from any place on the
main traveled way of any interstate or federal-aid
primary highway in this State.
(8) "Destroyed Sign" means a sign damaged by
natural elements wherein t h e costs of re-erection
exceeds 30 percent of the depreciated value of the
sign as established by departmental appraisal methods.
(9) "Freeway" means a divided highway for
through traffic with full control access.
(10) "Grandfather Status" refers to any offpremise controlled sign erected in zoned or unzoned
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commercial or industrial areas, prior to May 9,1967,
even if the sign does not comply with the size,
lighting, or spacing of the Act and these Rules. Signs
only, and not sign sites, may qualify for such status.
(11) "H-l" means highway service zone as denned
in Subsection 27-12-136.3(8) of the Act.
(12) "Lease or Consent* means any written agreement by which possession of land, or permission to
use land for the purpose of erecting or maintaining a
sign, or both, is granted by the owner to another
person for a specified period of time.
(13) "Legal copy" means the advertising copy on
the sign that occupies at least 50% of the sign size.
(14) "Nonconforming Sign" means a sign that was
lawfully erected, but that does not conform to State
law or rules passed or made at a later date or that
later fails to comply with State legislation or rules
because of changed conditions. The term "illegally
erected" or "illegally maintained" is not synonymous
with the term, "nonconforming sign," nor is a sign
with "grandfather" status synonymous with the
term, "nonconforming sign."
(15) "Off-Premise Sign" means also, in supplement
to the definition stated in the Act, an outdoor advertising sign that advertises an activity, service or
product and that is located on premises other than
the premises at which such activity or service occurs
or product is sold or manufactured.
(16) "On-Premise Sign", in supplement to the
definition stated in the Act, does not include a sign
that advertises a product or service that is only
incidental to the principal activity or that brings
rental income to the property owner or occupant.
(17) "Out-of-Standard" means any sign that fails
to meet the standards and criteria set forth in the
Utah-Federal Agreement of January 18, 1968, or
more restrictive statutes or rules passed or made
subsequent thereto as to size, height, lighting, or
spacing.
(18) "Parkland" means any publicly owned land
that is designed or used as a public park, recreation
area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge, or historical site.
(19) "Property" as used in the definition of "OnPremise Sign" includes those areas from which the
general public is serviced and which are directly
connected with and are involved in assembling,
manufacturing, servicing, repairing, or storing of
products used in the business activity. This property
does not include the site of any auxiliary facilities
that are not essential to and customarily used in the
conduct of business, nor does it include property not
contiguous to the property on which the sign is
situated.
(20) "Sale or Lease Sign" means any sign situated
on the subject property that advertises that the
property is for "sale" or "lease". Such a sign may not
advertise any product or service unrelated to the
business of selling or leasing the land upon which it
is located, nor may it advertise a projected use of the
land or afinancingservice available or being utilized
in its development.
- (21) "Scenic Area" as used in the Act includes a
scenic byway.
2

(22) "Transient or Temporary Activity" means any
industrial or commercial activity, not otherwise
herein excluded, that does not have a prior continuous history for a period of six months.
(23) "Unzoned Area" means an area in which no
zoning is in effect. It does not include areas within
comprehensive zoning or master plans adopted by
local zoning authorities.
*
(24) "V-iype Sign" means any sign, the center pole
of which is nearest the traveled portion of the
highway and is a common pole to the two sign faces,
or if such common pole is not used, a sign with the
sign faces no further than 36 inches apart at the
angle of the sign closest to the traveled portion of the
highway, and the structure poles at the point nearest the traveled portion of the highway no further
apart than 48 inches. Existing V-type signs now
controlled and permitted are excluded from this
definition.
(25) "Visible" means capable of being seen whether
or not readable, without visual aid, by a person of
normal visual acuity.
R933-2-4. Permits.
(1) All controlled outdoor advertising signs legally
in existence prior to the effective date of the 1967
Act, or that are legally created thereafter, must have
a permit. This includes off-premise signs located on
the side of or on top of any fixed object or building
and visible from the main traveled way of an interstate or federal-aid primary highway.
(2) Anyone preparing to erect a controlled sign
shall apply for the permit before beginning construction of the sign. Permits shall be issued in the
manner prescribed in Section 27-12-136.7. Permits
may be issued only for signs that are to be erected in
commercial or industrial zones or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas, as denned by the Act.
Insomuch as a sign cannot lawfully be constructed
or maintained unless there is legal access to the
property on which the sign is proposed to be located,
a permit may not be issued if the applicant does not
have legal access to that property.
(3) Permits may be issued only for signs already
lawfully erected or to be lawfully erected within 90
days from the date of the issuance of the permit.
Within 30 daysfromthe date of issuance, the permit
must be affixed to the completed sign for which the
permit was issued as provided in subsection 5 of this
section.
(4) A permit affixed to a sign other than the sign
for which it was issued is unlawful, and remedial
action shall be taken by the permittee by the proper
affixing of the permit to the correct sign within 30
days of notice to the permittee.
(5) Permits issued under Section 27-12-136.7 shall
be permanently attached to the sign in such a
position so as to be readily visible from the nearest
highway in the direction of travel to the sign faces. If
the sign is a single-face cross-highway reader, then
the permit must be attached to the sign in a position
readily visible from the nearest traveled portion of
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the highway. The permittee is responsible for the
proper placement of the permit on the sign.
(6) Sign permits that have been lost or destroyed
must be replaced, and new permits for signs otherwise lawful shall be issued upon the payment of a
$25.00 fee for each sign and the completion of a new
permit application.
^
, < ^.
(7) Permits shall be issued on a one year fiscal
basis, and shall be renewed on or before the first day
of July of each year.
(8) The fee for a new permit is $100.00* for the
one-year fiscal period or any part thereof. The permit expires June 30 of the fiscal year. The fee for
permit renewal is $25.00 for the one-year fiscal
period or any part thereof.
(9) The fee for permits issued within a one-year
fiscal period shall not be prorated.
(10) One-year permit renewals shall be made on
renewal v forms prepared by the Department.
Completion of the renewal application and obtaining
of the renewal permit prior to the expiration of the
existing permit shall be the sole responsibility of the
owner. The renewal may be applied for no sooner
than 60 days prior to July 1 of the year in which the
permit is to be renewed.
(11) Written proof of lease or consent from site
owner to erect or maintain an outdoor advertising
sign must be furnished by the applicant at the time
of application for an original permit. This proof may
consist of an affidavit showing the landowner's name
and address, the signowner's name, and the sign
location by route, milepost, address, and county. On
renewal of the permit the applicant must certify that
the sign site is still under valid lease to the applicant.
(12) If a one-year permit on a conforming sign is
not renewed on or before July 1 of the year of its
term, a new permit application shall be required for
a new permit, along with a fee of $100.00.
(13) A permit issued under Section 27-12-136.7. is
non transferable, and the permittee shall be liable
for any violation of the law regarding the permitted
sign. No new permit may be issued for a sign for
which a permit has already been issued, except as
follows:
(a) Transfer of ownership of a permitted sign shall
require the holder of the valid permit to release, in
writing, his rights to continue to maintain his sign
or use his location for outdoor advertising. The new
owner applicant shall then submit to the Utah
Department of Transportation the said written release and proof of having obtained sign ownership,
and a valid lease or consent for the remainder of the
permit term. A $100.00 fee shall accompany the
application and both application and fee must be
received within 30 days of the ownership transfer.
(b) A conforming sign that is unlawful and forfeited by the permittee may be acquired and permitted, providing the new sign applicant submits the
completed permit application and proof of possession of a valid land lease or consent to maintain a
sign at the described location and providing the new
application and the sign are otherwise lawful.
January 1,1996
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(14)-A supplemental application fee of $100.00
shall be charged to cover administrative and inspection costs for every sign that was erected without a
sign permit (R-299) or altered without prior written
approval of the department (R-407). This supplemental fee is in addition to the regular $100.00
permit fee.
r
(15) Each application for a new permit must be
accompanied by the approved building permit of the
local governing authority or a written statement
from that authority that building permits are not
required under its ordinances.
(16) Where local authority has issued a building
permit for construction of a sign, but such construction is contrary to the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act,
the action of the local authority does not require the
State to issue a permit.
(17) Federal agencies, State agencies, counties,
cities and towns that use outdoor advertising signs
along the interstate or primary highway systems
shall have a permit for each controlled sign as
provided in the Act and these rules.
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance.
(1) Sign changes or repairs, including those for
signs in a commercial or industrial zone, are subject
to the following requirements:
(a) The face of a controlled sign may be removed
for maintenance and renovation or change of advertising copy using basically the same face material.
The shape and size of advertising space may not be
changed except as provided in these rules. Replacement of the sign face must be accomplished within a
60 day period from the date of its removal.
(b) A nonconforming sign with "Grandfather Status" may not be relocated, structurally altered, nor
repositioned, including reversing the direction of the
sign face.
(c) A conforming sign may be reshaped or modified
as to height or size, or relocated upon proper written
request (R-407), provided such change is in compliance with the Act and these rules. Any such change
shall be completed within 60 calendar days from the
date of the approval of the request. A fee of $100.00
shall accompany the R-407 application to change the
sign, in addition to any applicable fee under R9332-4(14).
(d) A conforming sign that is damaged by vandals,
storms, wind, or acts of nature can be re-erected or
changed, or both, upon proper written request and
approval on Form R-407.
(e) A nonconforming sign that is damaged but not
destroyed by vandals or acts of nature may be
repaired to the same size or shape upon proper
written application and approval. Normal maintenance may be included in the repair, but no structural changes affecting the sign's value may be
allowed. The sign may be purchased by the State if
agreement is reached by the State and the sign
owner. The compensation to the sign owner shall be
the depreciated value of the sign immediately before
damage, less cost of re-erection or repair.

UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

3

R933-2-6

TRANSPORTATION

(f) Repairs and ordinary maintenance may be
made on conforming and nonconforming signs so
long as such repairs do not alter the basic advertising space or illumination, or change the material of
the sign structure.
(g) Nonconforming signs destroyed by natural
disaster are not eligible for compensation, unless at
the time of destruction they have been appraised
and committed for removal and the State has approved a purchase agreement.
(2) The following provisions govern maintenance:
(a) A legally permitted nonconforming sign may
remain standing subject to the provisions of the Act
and these rules so long as it is not changed, (except
for advertising copy) and is not purchased or condemned pursuant to law.
(b) Signs shall be properly maintained. Improper
maintenance is considered:
(i) Paint faded or peeling extensively;
(ii) Message not visible or illegible;
(iii) Sheets or panels loose or sagging;
(iv) Structural supports leaning;
(v) Substantially damaged by acts of nature or age
deterioration;
(vi) Abandoned.
(c) A sign with any of the deficiencies listed in
subsection (b) is not in a reasonable state of repair, is
in violation of the law, and is subject to removal.
(d) The crossing of a right-of-way line of any State
highway at other than an established access approach to erect or maintain a sign without the
written permission of the Department, is unlawful.

(6) A trailer or mobile home park, court, or facility
does not qualify under Subsection 27-12-136.4(l)(d)
or (e) regardless of the local zoning. An RV Park does
not qualify under either of those subsections unless
at least three-fourths of the total available trailer
parking spaces are not occupied or reserved for
rental on a month-to-month basis.
(7) Where an occupied residence is located along
the highway right of way within 600 feet of a
commercial or industrial activity, no controlled sigfi
may be erected closer than one hundred (100) feet of
the residence unless the owner of the residence
expressly waives in writing the foregoing restriction.
The waiver must be submitted with the permit
application prior to the erection of a new sign.
(8) Where the width of the right of way in a
commercial or industrial area is more than 300 feet,
and there is commercial activity on only one side of
the highway, that activity does not qualify the opposite side of the highway as commercial or industrial
usage for the purpose of erecting new outdoor advertising signs.

R933-2-7. Spacing For Permitted Signs.
(1) Spacing of permitted signs shall be as follows:
(a) Signs in unincorporated areas may not be
spaced less than 500 feet apart on the interstate and
federal-aid primary system, as measured parallel to
the highway right of way. Any sign allowed to be
erected in a highway service zone (H-l) may not be
less than 500 feet from an existing controlled sign
R933-2-6. Commercial and Industrial Usage: adjacent to an interstate highway or primary highway except that signs may be erected less than 500
Limitations in Zoned or Unzoned Areas.
feet
from each other if the sign faces on the same
(1) Controlled signs in zoned or unzoned indusside
of the interstate highway or limited access
trial or commercial areas are subject to the following
primary highway are not simultaneously visible.
zoning and usage requirements:
(b) No sign may be erected more than 100 feet on
(a) Commercial or industrial usage must be visible
from a traveled portion of the highway and must be the perpendicular from the edge of the right of way
situated within 600 feet of the sign site (measured of an interstate or primary highway except where a
from, the outer edge of the regularly used buildings, non-controlled highway or railroad right of way runs
parking lot, storage or processing area of the activ- contiguous and adjacent to the edge of the controlled
highway. The 100-foot corridor shall then be meaity).
v
(b) The sign site must be zoned commercial or sured from a point on the perpendicular not to
industrial or be in an unzoned commercial or indus- exceed 200 feet from the edge of the right of way of
the interstate or primary highway. In no case may
trial area. <(2) Airport runways or parking or aircraft tie down the outer edge of the corridor exceed 350 feet from
areas are not zoned or unzoned commercial or in- the controlled right of way.
(c) Any sign located within the controlled area of
dustrial areas.
(3) Mining operations and related activities, in- both the interstate system and a primary system
cluding gravel pits are not zoned or unzoned com- must meet the spacing requirements of both highmercial or industrial areas unless they are:
way systems.
(a) Where the final and concentrated processing of
(d) If a sign message may be read from two or more
mined or extracted minerals is effected; or
routes, one or more of which is a controlled route,
(b) Where the mined material which has been the more stringent of applicable control requireprocessed is regularly stored or held for sale or ments applies. «,
shipment.
' '
(2) Height Above Highway: *
- (4) Farming or ranching areas or related dairy
No new structure, including the sign face, may be
farm facilities, of whatever nature, are not zoned or more than 50 feet in height above the elevation of
unzoned commercial or industrial areas. *~ K. <
the edge of the traveled surface of the highway.
^ • (5) Municipal or private golf courses or cemeteries Where local zoning requirements or ordinances are
are not zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial in effect, the stricter of any appUcable zoning reareas. « \***"' *&- .suc-aci i* *d*s&*#i ~&^ "•.« quirements or ordinances apply. *w JA, J*TU r.*. u,- **•
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R933-2-8. Removal of Illegal Signs.
(1) Removal Costs: The costfor the removal by the
Utah Department of Transportation of an illegal or
abandoned sign shall be assessed jointly and severally against the signowner, landowner, occupant of
the land or other responsible person, or any combination thereof, in accordance with Section 27-12r
136.9.
*
(2) Storage Charges: Illegal or abandoned signs
that have been removed by the Department after
proper notice to the sign and site owner or occupant
of the land shall be stored at the nearest department
shed. There shall be a charge of $25.00 per month
levied as the storage charges. The storage charges
shall be in addition to the costs of the removal of the
illegal or abandoned sign.
(3) Redemption and Disposal: If the illegal or
abandoned sign has not been claimed and redeemed
within 30 days from the date of removal, notice to
the sign owner, site owner, and occupant of the land
shall be given. If the sign is not redeemed within 30
days thereafter, a designated Department official in
the area in which the sign is stored shall proceed to
dispose of the stored illegal or abandoned sign by
either utilizing the material contained therein for
Utah Department of Transportation maintenance
purposes or destroying the sign. A statement of the
sign disposal shall be made and filed with a designated person at the Department.
R933-2-9. Termination of Non-Conforming Use
Status.
(1) The non-conforming use status of a controlled
sign shall terminate under the following conditions:
(a) Failure of the sign owner to apply for a renewal
permit on or before the date on which the permit
expires;
(b) Structural alteration or change of the sign as to
height, size, location or direction of sign face not
constituting ordinary maintenance or a change of
advertising matter;
(c) Destruction by storm, wind, act of nature, fire
or vandalism;
(d) Abandonment;
(e) Failure to correct after receiving proper notice
pursuant to Section 27-12-136.9, or failure to ask for
a hearing after receiving proper notice pursuant to
Section 27-12-136.9, or failure to file a written
response as required by law, or failure to appeal
from an adverse decision of the Department, or
exhaustion of all legal remedies under Section 2712-136.9.
(f) Purchase by the Department under Section
27-12-136.11.
(g) Acquisition at any time by the Department for
highway construction.
R933-2-10. Conforming Sign Becoming Nonconforming — Removal.
(1) Any legal conforming sign that becomes nonconforming after May 9, 1967, (by reason of law or
route classification) may not be required to be removed under the Utah Advertising Act until after
January 1,1996
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the end of the fifth year after it had become nonconforming, except as otherwise provided for by law or
contract.
<>
• „
R933-2-11. On-Premise Signs — Illegal Status
— Removal.
An on-premise sign loses its on-premise status
when the business or activity it advertises has
ceased to exist for a period of at least 12 months at
the site of the sign, the sign is located within 1000
feet of a controlled highway, and the message
thereon is visible to the traveling public from such
highway. Any such sign may be removed at the
expense of the sign owner or land owner or both
without compensation to the sign or site owner as
provided in Section 27-12-136.9 of the Act.
R933-2-12. Directional Signs.
(1) Directional signs shall conform to federal standards concerning the lighting, size, number, and
spacing of the signs. There are no zoning or usage
requirements for directional signs.
(2) The following standards apply only to directional signs that are erected and maintained adjacent to the interstate and federal-aid primary highway system, and that are visible from the main
traveled way.
(a) A directional sign allowed under the Utah Code
is subject to the following restrictions:
(i) No sign may exceed the following limits (all
dimensions include border and trim, but exclude
supports):
(A) Maximum area - 150 square feet
(B) Maximum height • 20 feet
(C) Maximum length - 20 feet
(ii) A sign may be illuminated, subject to the
following:
(A) Signs that are not effectively shielded so as to
prevent Ught from being directed at any portion of
the traveled way of an interstate or primary highway, or that cause glare or impair the vision of the
driver of any motor vehicle, or that otherwise interfere with any driver's operation of a motor vehicle,
are prohibited.
(B) No sign may be so illuminated as to obscure or
interfere with the effectiveness of an official traffic
sign, device, or signal.
(iii) Each location of a directional sign must be
approved by the Department and is subject to the
following restrictions:
(A) No directional sign may be located within 2000
feet of an interchange or intersection at grade within
the interstate system or other freeways or the primary system (measured from the nearest point of
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to
the main traveled way).
(B) No directional sign may be located within 2000
feet of a rest area, parkland, or scenic areas.
(C) Directional signs facing the same direction of
travel shall be spaced no less than one mile apart.
(D) No more than one directional sign per activity
facing the same direction of travel may be erected
along a single route approaching the activity.
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(E) Signs adjacent to the interstate or primary the controlled highway, be erected and maintained
system shall be located within 15 air miles of the by or for the purpose of designating a city or town or
other subdivision.
activity they advertise.
(iv) No official sign may be located within 2000
(iv) Any area of historical interest shall be approved by the Utah Historical Society before consid- feet of an interchange or intersection at grade along
eration for approval as an area for a directional sign. the interstate or primary highway system (mea(b) The following directional signs are prohibited: sured from the nearest point of pavement widening
(i) Signs advertising activities that are illegal at the exit from the main traveled way.)
(v) No official sign may be so illuminated as to
under Federal or State law in effect at the location of
interfere with the effectiveness of, or obscure, an
those signs or activities:
(ii) Signs positioned in such a manner as to official traffic sign, device, or signal.
(vi) Signs that are not effectively shielded so as to
obscure or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness
of an official traffic sign, signal, or device, or to prevent light from being directed at any portion of
obstruct or interfere with the driver's view of ap- the traveled way of an interstate or primary highway, or that cause glare or impair the vision of the
proaching, merging, or intersecting traffic;
(iii) Signs erected or maintained upon trees or driver of any motor vehicle, or that otherwise interpainted or drawn upon rocks, or other natural fea- fere with any driver's operation of a motor vehicle,
are prohibited.
tures;
(vii) No sign may be located within 500 feet of a
(iv) Obsolete signs;
(v) Signs that are structurally unsafe or in disre- rest area, parkland, cemetery, or scenic area or other
official sign.
pair,
(viii) No sign may be erected at a site prohibited
(vi) Signs that contain or are illuminated by any
flashing or moving light or animated by moving under local zoning. The stricter commercial and
industrial zoning and usage requirements appliparts;
(vii) Signs located in rest areas, parklands, or cable to controlled outdoor advertising signs do not
apply to official signs, though all other relevant rules
scenic areas;
(3) Any directional sign erected or maintained apply.
(ix) No sign message may be altered without prior
under the Act and these rules may at any time be
removed for cause upon order of the Department written approval by the department.
(x) Any official sign erected or maintained under
after notice and hearing, if requested and timely
the Act and these Rules may at any time be removed
pursued, under Section 27-12-136.9.
for cause and without compensation after notice and
R933-2-13. Official Signs.
hearing, if required. The owner of any such sign
(1) Prerequisites for Erection and Maintenance:
shall remove the sign at its own cost and expense.
(a) Prior to erection of an official sign the public
agency shall submit to the Department in the Dis- R933-2-14. Department Hearings.
Any hearing regarding the legality of a sign shall
trict where the sign is to be located, a completed
be held in the region where the sign is located, and
permit application form R-299 along with:
shall be held in accordance with the Act, and in
(i) Facsimile of the sign message to be erected;
(ii) Statement of the official duty or responsibility accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule R907-1 of the Utah Administrabeing performed;
(iii) Certified copy of the statute, resolution, or tive Code unless specifically stated otherwise in a
ordinance from the public body showing official governing statute.
action authorizing erection and maintenance of the
R933-2-15. Prosecution for Violation of Act or
sign. Rules.
(b) The sign must be erected off the highway
Notice to the sign owner or site owner is not
right-of-way, owned and maintained by the public
agency, and located within the zoning jurisdiction of necessary prior to the filing of a complaint under
Section 27-12-136.12.
the public agency.
(c) Standards, Criteria and Restrictions:
R933-2-16. Saving Clause.
(i) Only information of general interest to the
The Rules contained herein supersede all other
traveling public may be placed on an official sign. Rules heretofore adopted by the Department. If a
Commercial advertising of a particular service, final court order determines that any provision of
product or facility is prohibited.
these Rules is invalid for any reason, or that the
(ii) The sign must be within the zoning jurisdic- application of any provision is invalid, the court's
tion of the city, town, or other public agency desig- determination shall not affect the validity and ennated by the sign.
forceability of the remainder of these Rules.
(iii) No city, town or other subdivision of the State
may erect or maintain more than one sign at each R933-2-17. Effective Date.
approach to the off-ramp, facing oncoming traffic at
Upon their adoption by the Utah Transportation
the nearest point of turn off to such city, town or Commission, these Rules shall become effective in
other subdivision and in no event may more than accordance with the Utah Administrative Ruletwo such signs, one for each direction of travel upon making Act.
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R933-3-6.

<References: 27-12-136.1 through 27-12-136.13. : j <> , \ and inadequate public crossroads for property acHistory: 9344, EMR, 04/25/88; 15895, NEW, .07/15/94; cess. **
16111, NSC, 09/01^4.
3. On other than bypass roads, a maximum of five

accesses per mile on each Bide of the highway, may
be
granted. Unless justified under this rule, accesses
R933-3. R e l o c a t i o n o r Modification of Exto property shall only be granted opposite to each
i s t i n g A u t h o r i z e d A c c e s s O p e n i n g s or other.
<
. *.
Granting N e w A c c e s s O p e n i n g s o n Lim4. Where any one property has access to another
public road or roads, no access shall be given closer
ited Access Highways.
than one-half mile from the public road nor shall any
R933-3-1. Authority.
two granted accesses be closer than one-half mile
R933-3-2. Purpose.
with the following exception: The proposed project
R933-3-3. Definition.
involves reconstruction on, or near to, an existing
R933-3-4. When Access is Controlled.
highway where a home, business or other property
R933-3-5. Designation of Access Location.
development is located and lack of direct access to
R933-3-6. Revision of Access Openings.
them would involve excessive property damage and
R933-3-7. New Access Openings.
added construction costs, in which case access openR933-3-8. Document Responsibility.
ings can be provided within the other stated limitaR933-3-9. Enforcement of Access Control.
tions.
4
5. No property access shall be closer than 500 feet
R933-3-1. Authority.
from another property or public road access.
' This rule is allowed under Section 27-12-114 of
6. In order to eliminate public road access, study
Utah Code.
shall be made in conjunction with local authorities
as to feasibility of dead ending or rerouting of
R933-3-2. Purpose,
intersecting roads.
To establish a procedure for designating and es7. The maximum size of private access openings
tablishing new or existing highways as limited ac- are shall be 16 feet for residences, 30 feet for farms
cess facilities, for the elimination of intersections or other areas where large equipment is used, and
and for the right to access restricted facilities.
50 feet for commercial and industrial areas.
D. Exceptions to the above limitations shall only
R933-3-3. Definition.
be made if a careful appraisal reveals extensive
Limited-access facility shall be denned as in Sec- damage or if needed frontage roads would involve
tion 27-12-2(5) of the Utah Code.
excessive right of way costs or, in canyons, excessive
construction costs. Detailed reports of costs and
R933-3-4. When Access is Controlled.
justification for variance shall be prepared and subA. Limited access control for functionally classi- mitted to the assistant director for approval.
fied principal arterial highways other than the interstate system and expressways shall be obtained R933-3-5. Designation of Access Location.
in all rural areas and in urban areas if the highway
A. The Utah Department of Transportation Right
is being constructed on new alignment or if the of Way division shall conduct a study and prepare
existing highway is in sparsely developed areas detailed right of way maps, to be used by the Utah
where control is desirable and economically feasible. Transportatiorr~ Commission to make final access
Control in urban areas on existing alignment shall location determination. The study will include the
not be allowed unless designated by the Utah Trans- location of and justification for current access openings and property owners shall be contacted to
portation Commission.
B. In addition to the limited access control of determine development plans for the property. The
principal arterial highways, a limited mileage of Right of Way Division shall prepare cost estimates
high volume minor arterial highways may justify for proposed and alternate access locations. The
limited access control, especially if on new align- Utah Transportation Commission shall make final
ment and if adjacent to a freeway interchange. access location determination.
B. The access openings granted shall be accuExcept for minor arterial highways adjacent to a rately described in the property deed and shown on
freeway interchange, control shall not be estab- right of way maps and roadway construction plans.
lished if the road is less than one mile in length.
C. After execution of the deeds, no change shall be
Access, if desirable and economically feasible on made in the access location or additional access
such roads, shall be determined on an individual openings granted except as provided below.
basis and is subject to approval of Utah TransportaD. If a portion of a property which has no access to
tion Commission.
the highway is later sold, the department has no
C. Under limited access control, the following obligation to grant an access to the property and if
limitations shall apply:
inquiries are made, a prospective buyer should be
1. The maximum feasible and economic access definitely so advised.
control shall always be obtained.
2. On bypasses of cities and towns, all property R933-3-6. Revision of Access Openings.
^ access shall be prohibited except where the bypass is
A If a property owner desires to change location
" of a low population town with little or no business or size of an access opening, after execution of the
January 1, 1996
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THE MICHIE COMPANY
Law Publishers
Charlottesville, Virginia

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to
the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of
any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i)
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
-proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a

Tab 2

CARMAN E. KIPP - #1829
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK - #4671
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Edward Rogers, individually and as to his
:
assigned interest in Utah Outdoor Advertising,
TERRY REID, individually and as to his assigned
interest in Utah Outdoor Advertising, UTAH
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, dba, UTAH SIGN, :
INC., LYNN D. KITCHEN, individually, BETH
K. KITCHEN, individually, ada FULL SERVICE :
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

AFFIDAVIT OF
GORDON ROBERTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 970906625 CV
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, and
BURBIDGE AND MITCHELL,

Judge L. A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Affiant Gordon Roberts, beingfirstduly sworn, deposes and states the following:

EXHIBIT "»'

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah. I was admitted

to the Utah State Bar in 1965.
2.

I am currently a shareholder in the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer. My

practice emphasizes civil trials. I am a Fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers.
3.

I have been retained as an expert consultant by defendants in this case.

4.

I have reviewed pleadings, discovery materials and correspondence from the

underlying case ROA Advertising. Inc. v. Lvnn P. Kitchen, et al. I have also discussed the
underlying case with defendant Stephen B. Mitchell ("Mitchell").
5.

It is my opinion that in connection with the Rule 41 (a) issue, neither Mitchell

nor Burbidge and Mitchell committed a breach of the applicable standard of care which resulted in
any damage to plaintiffs.
6.

I disagree with plaintiffs' allegation that defendants breached the applicable

standard of care by not filing a Motion to Pismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
7.

Mitchell's tactical decision not to file a Rule 41(a) motion was sound for the

following reasons:
a.

A Rule 41(a) motion would not have succeeded in dismissing Reagan

Outdoor Advertising's ("Reagan's") claim for actual forcible entry because the forcible entry
claim was a new claim not raised in Reagan's earlier-filed cases.

2

b.

Reagan's claim against plaintiffs for breach of lease was invalid, as

witnessed by the fact the trial court eventually granted the Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Mitchell on that claim. In granting summary judgment the court held that Reagan's
lease had terminated. More importantly, the Motion for Summary Judgment achieved the
same result with regard to the breach of lease claim that plaintiffs would have achieved by
filing a Rule 41(a) motion. It is rank speculation to suggest that the summary judgment
strategy was more costly than the Rule 41(a) strategy.
c.

Mitchell reasonably believed that a Rule 41(a) motion would not

succeed because the trial court was unlikely to dismiss Reagan's claims with prejudice
without Reagan having had an opportunity to litigate its claims, especially in light of the
forcible entry. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment.
d.

Mitchell reasonably believed that Judge Rigtrup, before whom the

case was then pending, would be less receptive than Judge Young to Utah Sign's claims

3

because of Judge Rigtrup's obvious displeasure at Utah Sign's forcible entry upon the
Kitchen leasehold interest. This was a matter of reasonable legal judgment.
DATED this Jj_ day of August, 1998.

tfi

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ]9_ day of August, 1998

My Commission Expires:

1 Jitjol
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305)
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801) 521-1775

^^JJI

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. a Utah
Corporation, dba REAGAN
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LYNN D. KITCHEN, an individual,
and BETH K. KITCHEN, an
individual, aka FULL SERVICES
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Judge

JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, R.O.A. General, Inc., a Utah
corporation, by and through counsel, and for causes of action
complains and alleges as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, doing
business in Utah as Reagan Outdoor Advertising

(hereinafter

"ROA"), with its principal place of business located in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
2.

Upon information and belief the defendants, Lynn D.

Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen

(hereinafter the "Kitchens"), are

husband and wife and are residents of the State of Utah,
3.

Upon

Development

information

Company

and

belief

is a business entity

the

Full

formerly

Services
owned and

operated by the Kitchens.
4.

The situs of the real property involved in this action

is in, and the causes of action set forth herein arose in, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5.

On May 12th, 1973, the Kitchens, as lessors, entered

into an outdoor advertising lease agreement with ROA, as lessee,
to

allow

the

construction

and

maintenance

of

an

outdoor

advertising sign, or billboard, for a period of forty years on
property located adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 435
West, 2720 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah. A true and correct
copy of this agreement

(hereinafter the "Lease") is attached

hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference incorporated herein.
6.

It was the intent of the parties that paragraph 3 of the

agreement was exercised simultaneous with the execution of the
Lease.
7. An outdoor advertising sign was subsequently constructed
on the leased property, or premises, at the designated site. ROA
-2-

has since utilized the sign for outdoor advertising purposes, has
maintained said sign, and has paid regular rental therefore•
8.

By correspondence dated March 17, 1981, and again by

subsequent correspondence dated July 20, 1983, ROA reviewed the
period of the agreement with the Kitchens, and to avoid any
misunderstanding advised them of the exercise of any option for
continuation or renewal of the Lease that may not have been
exercised prior to that time.
correspondence

are attached

True and correct copies of said
hereto as Exhibits

,f H

B

and "C",

respectively, and by reference are incorporated herein.
9.

By recent correspondence dated September 2, 1994, the

Kitchens have advised ROA of their intent to breach the Lease by
attempting to enforce a premature termination of ROA ! s leasehold
interest and force the removal of the sign,

A true and correct

copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and
by reference incorporated herein,

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
10.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9 of

this Complaint.
11.

ROA has timely exercised its renewal option under the

provisions of the Lease.
12.

ROA has continuously tendered rental for the premises,

to include the period from August of 1993 to date.

-3-

True and

correct copies of said rental checks are attached hereto as
Exhibit "E" and by reference are incorporated herein.
13.
conduct,

The Kitchens have taken a position, or course of
in

accepting

said

rental

payments

that

is

wholly

inconsistent with their current position that the Lease is now
subject to termination.
14.

Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by sending to ROA

a notice of termination while the Lease is in full force and
effect.
15.

ROA f s utilization of its leasehold interest in the

above-described premises has resulted in the development of a
valuable

asset,

any

deprivation

of

which

would

result

in

significant pecuniary damages to ROA.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Forcible Entry)
16.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 15

of this Complaint.
17.

ROA is currently is peaceable possession of the leased

premises and continues to maintain its outdoor advertising sign
on the site.
18. Kitchens have, by and through their attorneys, indicated
an intent to forcibly enter upon the premises leased to, and
being utilized by, ROA to turn ROA out and thereby deprive ROA of
a unique and valuable asset for which ROA has paid valuable
consideration.

Should such a forcible entry occur it would
-4-

result in significant pecuniary damages to ROA/ the extent of
which may be impossible to determine.
19.

Such forcible entry would be in violation of the Lease

and would entitle ROA to treble damages as provided for by § 7836-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Interference with Business Relationships)
20.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 19

of this Complaint.
21.

ROA has formed a regular client base as a result of the

development of its leasehold interest in the subject premises.
Kitchens have direct knowledge of the utilization of the premises
for outdoor advertising purposes and that ROA provides outdoor
advertising services by contract to third parties.
22. Kitchens' declared intent to force an early termination
of the Lease and to compel the removal of ROA and its sign from
the premises will
continue

to

directly

provide

the

interfere with

contracted

for

ROA f s

outdoor

ability

to

advertising

services to third parties, of which the Kitchens are well aware.
23.

The Kitchens1 declared intent to interfere with ROA's

advertising contracts is wilful and intentional. ROA is entitled
to punitive damages should any interference with its business
relationships occur as a result of Kitchens1 actions.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Specific Performance)
24.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 2 3

of this Complaint.
25.

ROA's outdoor advertising is sited on a unique location

that cannot be replaced and is made the more valuable thereby.
ROA is entitled to specific performance of the Lease by the
Kitchens.
26.

ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances

described herein that it is entitled specific performance of the
Lease and, if necessary, an order permanently

enjoining

the

Kitchens from interfering with ROA's leasehold in the premises,
from

seeking

a premature termination

of the

Lease, or from

compelling the removal of ROA's outdoor advertising sign.

WHEREFORE, ROA prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For an order of specific performance and, if necessary,

the entry of a permanent injunction against the defendants, their
successors and assigns, preventing them from interfering with
ROA's use and enjoyment of the leased premises;
2.

For such damages in the amount of at least $300,000.00,

as may be incurred by ROA as a result of Kitchensf attempts to
prematurely terminate the Lease and to compel ROA to vacate the
premises, as well as an award of treble damages and punitive
damages in an amount of at least $100,000.00.
3.

For ROA's costs of court incurred herein; and
-6-

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper•
DATED this

day of September, 1994

r^i^

Douglas/*!. Hall
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84116
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305)
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801) 521-1775

HOV - 9 1994

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. a Utah
Corporation, dba REAGAN
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
Plaintiff,

[
[

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[

vs.

I

LYNN D. KITCHEN, an individual, |
and BETH K. KITCHEN, an
individual, aka FULL SERVICES
|
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, UTAH
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., aka
UTAH SIGN, INC., and JOHN DOES
III thru V,

Civil No. 940905728 PR
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, R.O.A. General, Inc., a Utah
corporation, by and through counsel, pursuant to leave of court,
amends its earlier filed complaint and alleges as follows:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, doing
business in Utah as Reagan Outdoor Advertising
11

(hereinafter

ROA") , with its principal place of business located in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
-1-

2.

The defendants, Lynn D. Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen

(hereinafter the "Kitchens") , are husband and wife and are
residents of the State of Utah.
3.

Upon

information

and

belief

the

Full

Services

Development Company is a business entity formerly owned and
operated by the Kitchens.
4.

The

defendant

Utah

Outdoor

Advertising,

Inc.

(hereinafter "Utah Sign"), is a Utah corporation in good standing
and was first incorporated as Utah Sign, Inc.
5.

The situs of the real property involved in this action

is in, and the causes of action set forth herein arose in, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
6.

On May 12th, 1973, the Kitchens, as lessors, entered

into an outdoor advertising lease agreement with ROA, as lessee,
to

allow

the

construction

and

maintenance

of

an

outdoor

advertising sign, or billboard, for a period of forty years on
property located adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 435
West, 2720 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the
"Premises") .

A

true

and

correct

copy

of

this

agreement

(hereinafter the "Lease") is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and
by reference incorporated herein.
7. An outdoor advertising sign was subsequently constructed
on the Premises at the designated site. ROA has since utilized
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the sign for outdoor advertising purposes, has maintained said
sign, and has paid regular rental therefore.
8.

By correspondence dated March 17, 1981, and again by

subsequent correspondence dated July 20, 1983, ROA reviewed the
period of the agreement with the Kitchens, and to avoid any
misunderstandings advised them of the exercise of any option for
continuation or renewal of the Lease that may not have been
exercised prior to that time.

True and correct copies of said

correspondence are attached hereto as Exhibits "Blf and

f, M

C,

respectively, and by reference are incorporated herein.
8. On or about August 29th, 1994, the Kitchens entered into
a separate outdoor sign location lease with Utah Sign for the
Premises.
9.

By recent correspondence dated September 2, 1994, the

Kitchens advised ROA of their intent to breach the Lease by
attempting to enforce a premature termination of ROA's leasehold
interest and force the removal of the sign.

A true and correct

copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit ,fD,f and
by reference incorporated herein.
10.

On September 13th, 1994, counsel for Kitchens served

upon ROA a "Notice to Quit Premises Within 15 Days." A true and
correct copy of said notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and
by reference is incorporated herein.
11.

On or about September 21st, 1994, counsel for the

Kitchens, after being questioned on the matter by counsel for
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ROA, advised ROA that the Kitchens would not take any action to
remove ROA's sign, but would seek relief in the courts.
12.

On or about October 7th, 1994, Utah Sign damaged ROA's

sign by cutting through the lower support and then removed ROA's
signs and supporting structures off of the Premises.
13.

Utah Sign then erected a new sign on the Premises

utilizing ROA's remaining lower support and foundation, and then
erected blank signs on the structure.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
14.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 13

of this Complaint.
15.

ROA has timely exercised its renewal option under the

provisions of the Lease.
16. ROA has continuously tendered rental for the premises,
to include the period from August of 1993 to date.
17.

The Kitchens have taken a position, or course of

conduct, in accepting

said rental payments that

is wholly

inconsistent with their current position that the Lease is now
subject to termination.
18.

Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by sending to ROA

a notice of termination while the Lease is in full force and
effect and by allowing Utah Sign to enter upon the Premises to
remove ROA's sign.
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19. Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by entering into a
new lease agreement with Utah Sign while the Lease is in full
force and effect.
20.

ROA's utilization of its leasehold interest in the

above-described premises has resulted in the development of a
valuable

asset, any

deprivation

of which

would ^result in

significant pecuniary damages to ROA.
21.

Kitchen's

breach

of

the

Lease

has

caused

ROA

significant pecuniary damages the full extent of which have yet
to be determined.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Forcible Entry)
22.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21

of this Complaint.
23.

ROA was is peaceable possession

and undisturbed

possession of the Premises, and entitled to maintain its outdoor
advertising sign on the site, when Utah Sign entered the Premises
and forcible removed ROA from said Premises.
24. Kitchens and Utah Sign's forcible removing ROA from the
Premises deprived ROA of a unique and valuable asset for which
ROA has paid

valuable

consideration.

Defendants1

actions

resulted in significant pecuniary damages to ROA, the extent of
which may be impossible to determine.
25.

Such forcible entry is in violation of the Lease and

entitles ROA to treble damages as provided for by § 78-36-10 of
the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Interference with Business Relationships)
26.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25

of this Complaint.
27. ROA has formed a regular client base as a result of the
development of its leasehold interest in the subject premises.
Kitchens and Utah Sign have direct knowledge of the utilization
of the premises for outdoor advertising purposes and that ROA
provides outdoor advertising

services by contract to third

parties.
28.

Utah Sign's negotiations with the Kitchens to acquire

a leasehold interest in the Premises and its removal of ROA and
ROA's sign from the Premises were wilful and intentional acts
intended to interfere with ROA's business relationship with the
Kitchens and with ROA's third party contracts and clientele.
29. Kitchens' lease agreement with Utah Sign, its declared
intent to force an early termination of the Lease and its removal
of ROA and its sign from the premises were wilful and intentional
acts intended to directly interfere with ROA's leasehold interest
in the Premises and its ability to continue to provide the
contracted for outdoor advertising services to third parties.
30.

ROA is entitled to an award of punitive damages

against the Defendants, and each of them jointly and severally,
as

a

result

of

said

Defendants1

willful

and

interference with R0Afs business relationships.
-6-

intentional

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Specific Performance)
31.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 30

of this Complaint.
32.

ROA's outdoor advertising is sited on a unique location

that cannot be replaced and is made the more valuable thereby.
ROA is entitled to specific performance of the Lease by the
Kitchens.
33.

ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances

described herein that it is entitled specific performance of the
Lease and,

if necessary, an order permanently

enjoining

the

Kitchens from interfering with ROA's leasehold in the premises,
from seeking a premature termination of the Lease, and to restore
ROA's sign to the premises, and to bear all costs and expenses
incurred thereby.
34.

ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances

described herein that it is entitled to an order requiring Utah
Sign to restore ROA and its sign to the Premises, and for them to
bear all costs and expenses incurred thereby.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Treble Damages)
35.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 34

of this Complaint.
36.

Outdoor advertising on the Premises is regulated by the

State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of § 27-12-136.1 et seq.
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of the Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) , otherwise known as
the "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act."
37.

ROA holds, and at all pertinent times herein held, the

only permit authorizing the maintenance of outdoor advertising on
the Premises.
38.

Pursuant to the provisions of § 27-12-136.9 of the Utah

Outdoor Advertising Act the Defendants, and each of them, are
liable to ROA for treble the amount of damages sustained by ROA
resulting from the damage to, and removal of, the ROA sign.
39.

ROA is also entitled to an award of its attorney's fees

incurred herein pursuant to the provisions of the above-noted
section of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conversion)
40.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 39

of this Complaint.
41.

After cutting through the lower portion of ROA's sign

structure Utah Sign then removed the upper portion from the
Premises and utilized the remains of the ROA structure upon which
to build their own sign.

This was accomplished without ROA's

permission or approval with the intent to permanently deprive ROA
of its lower structure.
42.

Utah Sign's actions, accomplished with the approval of

the Kitchen's, is an unlawful conversion of a significant portion
of ROA's sign to Defendants' own use and was done by improper
means for an improper purpose.
-8-

43 •

ROA is entitled to an award of actual and punitive

damages as against the Defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For a judicial determination that ROA is entitled to

continue to occupy the Premises, upon regular payment of the
rental called for in the Lease, to August 4, 2 013;
2.

For an order of specific performance and, if necessary,

the entry of a permanent injunction against the Defendants, their
successors and assigns, preventing them from interfering with
ROA's use and enjoyment of the Premises;
3.

For and order requiring Defendants to restore ROA and

its sign to the Premises, and that they bear all costs and
expenses to accomplish this;
3.

For

such

damages,

estimated

to

be

in

excess

of

$100,000.00, incurred by ROA as a result of Kitchens1 attempts to
prematurely terminate the Lease and resulting from Defendants'
forcible removal of ROA from the Premises;
4.

For an award of treble and punitive damages as against

the Defendants, jointly and severally, resulting from Defendants1
forcible entry;
5.

For

an

award

of

treble

damages

resulting

from

Defendants1 violation of the pertinent provisions of the Utah
Outdoor Advertising Act;
6.

For such actual damages suffered by ROA in such amount

as can be determined, and an award of punitive damages, resulting
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from

Defendants' willful

interference

with

ROA's contracts,

business relationships and opportunities;
7.

For

such

damages,

estimated

to

be

in

excess

of

$15,000.00, and for punitive damages, resulting from Defendants1
conversion of ROA's property to their own use;
8.

For ROA's costs of court incurred herein, to include the

award of reasonable attorneys1 fees; and
5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper,
DATED this

&&1

day of November, 1994.

DouglasfT. Hall
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84116

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that a true and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing Amended Complaint was served upon the Defendants by
mailing same, first class postage prepaid this
November, 1994, to defendants' counsel identified below.
J. Scott Brown
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
-10-

day of

Stephen B. Mitchell
BURBIDGE and MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/Cu
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
DOUGLAS T. HALL (1305)
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801) 521-1775
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. a Utah
Corporation, dba REAGAN
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LYNN D. KITCHEN, an individual,
and BETH K. KITCHEN, an
individual, aka FULL SERVICES
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I thru V,

s^ooa

C i v i l No.

judge

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAK

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, R.O.A. General, Inc., a Utah
corporation, by and through counsel, and for causes of action
complains and alleges as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation in good standing, doing
business in Utah as Reagan Outdoor Advertising

(hereinafter

"ROA"), with its principal place of business located in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

2.

Upon information and belief the defendants, Lynn D.

Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen

(hereinafter the "Kitchens"), are

husband and wife and are residents of the State of Utah.
3.

Upon

Development

information

Company

and

belief

is a business entity

the

Full

formerly

Services
owned

and

operated by the Kitchens.
4.

Defendants John Does I thru V are either

entities

or

individuals,

business

in

Salt

Lake

or

both, residing

County,

State

of

business

in and/or

Utah,

their

doing
actual

identities are as yet unknown to the Plaintiff.
5.

The situs of the real property involved in this action

is in, and the causes of action set forth herein arose in, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
6.

On May 12th, 1973, the Kitchens, as lessors, entered

into an outdoor advertising lease agreement with ROA, as lessee,
to

allow

the

construction

and

maintenance

of

an

outdoor

advertising sign, or billboard, for a period of forty years on
property located adjacent to Interstate 15 at approximately 435
West, 2720 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah. A true and correct
copy of this agreement

(hereinafter the

"Lease") is

attached

hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference incorporated herein.
7.

It was the intent of the parties that paragraph 3 of the

agreement was exercised simultaneous with the execution of the
Lease.
-2-

8. An outdoor advertising sign was subsequently constructed
on the leased property, or premises, at the designated site. ROA
has since utilized the sign for outdoor advertising purposes, has
maintained said sign, and has paid regular rental therefore.
9.

By correspondence dated March 17, 1981, and again by

subsequent correspondence dated July 20, 1983, ROA reviewed the
period of the agreement with the Kitchens, and to avoid any
misunderstanding advised them of the exercise of any option for
continuation or renewal of the Lease that may not have been
exercised prior to that time.
correspondence

True and correct copies of said

are attached hereto as Exhibits

"B" and

,f

C",

respectively, and by reference are incorporated herein.
10.

By recent correspondence dated September 2, 1994, the

Kitchens have advised ROA of their intent to breach the Lease by
attempting to enforce a premature termination of ROA's leasehold
interest and force the removal of the sign.

A true and correct

copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and
by reference incorporated herein.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
11.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 10

of this Complaint.
12.

ROA has timely exercised its renewal option under the

provisions of the Lease.
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13.

ROA has continuously tendered rental for the premises,

to include the period from August of 1993 to date.

True and

correct copies of said rental checks are attached hereto as
Exhibit "E" and by reference are incorporated herein.
14.
conduct,

The Kitchens have taken a position, or course of
in

accepting

said

rental

payments

that

is

wholly

inconsistent with their current position that the Lease is now
subject to termination.
15.

Kitchens are in breach of the Lease by sending to ROA

a notice of termination while the Lease is in full force and
effect.
16.

ROA's utilization of its leasehold interest in the

above-described premises has resulted in the development of a
valuable

asset,

any

deprivation

of

which

would

result

in

significant pecuniary damages to ROA, the full extent of which
are difficult to determine at this time but would be in excess of
$300,000.00.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Forcible Entry)
17.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 16

of this Complaint.
18.

ROA is currently is peaceable possession of the leased

premises and continues to maintain its outdoor advertising sign
on the site.
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19. Kitchens have, by and through their attorney, indicated
an intent to forcibly enter upon the premises leased to, and
being utilized by, ROA to turn ROA out and thereby deprive ROA of
a unique and valuable asset for which ROA has paid valuable
consideration.

Should such a forcible entry

occur

it would

result in significant pecuniary damages to ROA, the extent of
which may be impossible to determine.
20.

Such forcible entry would be in violation of the Lease

and would entitle ROA to treble damages as provided for by § 7836-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Interference with Business Relationships)
21.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 20

of this Complaint,
22-

ROA has formed a regular client base as a result of the

development of its leasehold interest in the subject premises.
Kitchens have direct knowledge of the utilization of the premises
for outdoor advertising purposes and that ROA provides outdoor
advertising services by contract to third parties.
23. Kitchens1 declared intent to force an early termination
of the Lease and to compel the removal of ROA and its sign from
the premises
continue

to

will

directly

provide

the

interfere with ROA f s

contracted

for

outdoor

ability

to

advertising

services to third parties, of which the Kitchens are well aware.
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24.

Plaintiff

attempting

to

believes

acquire

the

that

ROA

John

leasehold

Does
for

I thru

V

are

themselves

by

influencing the Kitchens to breach the Lease and to release the
site to them.
25.

The Kitchens' declared intent to interfere with ROA's

advertising contracts is wilful and intentional. ROA is entitled
to punitive damages should any interference with its business
relationships occur as a result of Kitchens1 actions.
26.

John Does1 I thru V attempts to interfere with ROA's

leasehold in the premises is wilful and intentional.

ROA is

entitled to punitive damages should any interference with its
business

relationships

Does 1

occur as a result of the John

actions.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Detrimental Reliance)
27.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26

of this Complaint.
28.

ROA has relied upon the provisions of the Lease which

granted to it a leasehold interest in the property for a period
of forty years and has acted thereupon accordingly.
29. ROA has relied upon the acceptance of the Lease by the
Kitchens, on the Kitchens1 acceptance of the tendered rents (see
Exhibit "E") and their acknowledgment of the provisions outlined
in

the

documents

referred

to

as

Exhibits

"B"

and

f, lf

C

by

developing the leasehold site, by continuing in possession, by
-6-

paying

rentals

therefore,

and

by entering

into third

party

contracts for outdoor advertising services.
Should it be determined that ROA f s reliance upon the

30.

aforementioned circumstances is misplaced and the Kitchens are
allowed

to terminate the Lease ROA would

suffer

significant

pecuniary damages, the full extent of which are difficult to
determine at this time, but would be in excess of $300,000.00.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Specific Performance)
31.

ROA incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 3 0

of this Complaint.
32.

ROA's outdoor advertising is sited on a unique location

that cannot be replaced and is made the more valuable thereby.
ROA is entitled to specific performance of the Lease by the
Kitchens.
33.

ROA submits that under the facts and circumstances

described herein that it is entitled specific performance of the
Lease

and,

if necessary, an order permanently

enjoining

the

Kitchens from interfering with R0Afs leasehold in the premises,
from

seeking

a premature

termination

of

the Lease, or

from

compelling the removal of ROA's outdoor advertising sign.

WHEREFORE, ROA prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For an order of specific performance and, if necessary,

the entry of a permanent injunction against the defendants, their
-7-

successors and assigns, preventing them from interfering with
ROA's use and enjoyment of the leased premises;
2.

For such damages in the amount of at least $3 00,000,00,

as may be incurred by ROA as a result of Kitchens1 attempts to
prematurely terminate the Lease and to compel ROA to vacate the
premises, as well as an award of treble damages and punitive
damages in an amount of at least $100,000.00.
3.

For ROA's costs of court incurred herein; and

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper.
DATED this

/ 3 ^ day of September, 1994.

/Q

DouglasKT. Hall
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84116
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